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RECENT CASES
ARBITRATION AND AWARD-AwA.D ORDERING SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE OF CONTRACT To CONSTRUCT AND LEASE FrvE-MnLIo1-DoILAR BUILDING CONFIRMED

Appellant contracted to construct a five-million-dollar department store
on its own land and to lease the building to respondent under a long-term
lease. After the plans and specifications had been nearly completed and
excavation had begun, appellant gave notice that, because of its inability to
obtain necessary mortgage money, it would be unable to continue construction unless respondent consented to an increase in the agreed rent. Respondent refused and the dispute was submitted to arbitration in accordance with
the contract's stipulation that all disputes would be arbitrated under American Arbitration Association rules, which allow the granting of specific
performance as a remedy for breach of contract.- After a full hearing on
the financial difficulties involved,2 the arbitrators ordered appellant to
proceed with the construction according to the contractual terms; 3 pursuant to New York statutory procedure, 4 the supreme court confirmed the
award 5 and the appellate division affirmed the confirmation, The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, assuming that the arbitration statute did not compel confirmation of an arbitration award directing
specific performance of a construction contract, confirmation was not an
abuse of the trial court's discretion. In the Matter of Grayson-Robinson
Stores, Inc., 8 N.Y.2d 133, 168 N.E.2d 377, 202 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1960).
The New York arbitration statute provides that, upon motion, arbitration awards shall be judicially confirmed unless prescribed grounds for
vacating or modifying the award are found.7 An award may be vacated
where there is corruption, fraud, or other misconduct on the part of the
I COMMERcIAL ARBITRATION RULES OF THE AMERIcAN ARBITRATION Ass'N § 42,
CASES ON ARBITRATION app. III, at 882 (1953).
in STURGES,
2
In the Matter of Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 9 Misc. 2d 796, 797, 168
N.Y.S.2d 513, 514 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
3
Brief for Petitioners, p. 7, In the Matter of Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc.,
8 N.Y.2d 133, 168 N.E.2d 377, 202 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1960).
4 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1461.
5 In the Matter of Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 9 Misc. 2d 796, 168 N.Y.S.2d
513 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
6 In the Matter of Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 7 App. Div. 2d 367, 183

N.Y.S.2d 695 (1959).
7N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1461.

At common law, arbitration awards granting

legal relief were enforced by an action at law, see Foster, Arbitration and Appraisals
it the Missouri Courts, 1954 WASH. U.L.Q. 49, 73, but those granting specific
performance were enforced by equity at its discretion. See Goldstein v. International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 328 Pa. 385, 394, 196 Atl. 43, 48 (1938) ; 3 STORY,
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1901-02 (14th ed. 1918). See generally STURGES, COMThe arbitrators' findings
MERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND AWARDs §§ 222-36 (1930).
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arbitrators, 8 while modification may be decreed where there is an obvious
error on the face of the record, or where the award is beyond the stipulation, or where there is a formal mistake in the award. 9 Although there
is authority that these statutory grounds are the sole bases on which a
court can refuse to confirm an award, 10 the New York courts have employed
additional reasons and have refused to confirm an award granting punitive
damages for contractual breach," one based on an usurious contract,' 2 and
one that would sanction a violation of the state penal laws. 1 3 On the other
both as to law and fact were binding on the court at law. Sweet v. Morrison, 116
N.Y. 19, 22 N.E. 276 (1889); Wheat Export Co. v. New Century Co., 185 App.
Div. 723, 732, 173 N.Y. Supp. 679, 685, aff'd, 227 N.Y. 595, 125 N.E. 926 (1919);
Fudickar v. Guardian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392, 399-400 (1875) (dictum);
3 STORY, op. cit. supra §§ 1897, 1899. However, the losing party could bring a bill in
equity to have the award set aside on grounds of fraud, accident, or mistake. 3 STORY,
op, cit. supra § 1895. An exception to the binding effect of the arbitrators' decision
on the law was made where the record dearly showed that the arbitrators had tried
to decide according to a legal rule, but had erroneously applied the rule. See Comment,8 38 CORNELL L.Q. 391, 416 (1953); Note, 63 HARv. L. REv. 681, 687 (1950).
N.Y. Civ. PRac. AcT § 1462.
9 N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. AcT 8 1462-a. The grounds for vacating and modifying are
basically a codification of the traditional rules. See note 7 supra; Foster, supra note 7,
at 74. But the statute does not provide for equitable discretion in confirming awards
directing specific performance. Compare note 7 supra. When the award is confirmed, it becomes a judgment of the court. N.Y. CiV. PRAc. AcT §§ 1464, 1466.
The New York act has become the prototype for many state and federal acts. E.g.,
9 U.S.C. §§ 10-11 (1958) ; CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE §§ 1287-89. See generally S=TUGES,
op. cit. supra note 7, § 422; Jones, The Nature of the Court's "Jurisdiction" in Statutory Arbitration Post-Award Motions, 46 CALIF. L. REv. 411, 426 (1958).
10
Hutto v. Jordan, 204 Miss. 30, 36 So. 2d 809 (1948) ; In the Matter of Congregation Talmud Torah, 283 App. Div. 892, 129 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1954) (alternative
holding). Cf. In the Matter of Spectrum Fabrics Corp., 285 App. Div. 710, 139
N.Y.S.2d 612, aff'd, 309 N.Y. 709, 128 N.E.2d 416 (1955).
11 Publishers' Ass'n v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Ass'n, 280 App. Div. 500,
114 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1952).
12 In the Matter of Gale, 176 Misc. 277, 282, 27 N.Y.S.2d 18, 23 (Sup. Ct.),
rev'd on other grounds, 262 App. Div. 834, 28 N.Y.S.2d 270 (1941).
13 In the Matter of Western Union Tel. Co., 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162 (1949)
(alternative holding). See also In the Matter of Harold Levinsohn Corp., 273 App.
Div. 469, 78 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1948), revd on other grounds, 299 N.Y. 454, 87 N.E.2d
510 (1949). The court of appeals seemed influenced by nonstatutory factors in
holding that the award in In the Matter of Marchant, 252 N.Y. 284, 300-01, 169
N.E. 386, 391-92, appeal disnissed, 282 U.S. 808 (1929), was beyond the stipulation.
The courts have also considered nonstatutory grounds on motions to compel arbitration
under N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1450. See In the Matter of Michelman, 5 Misc. 2d
570, 135 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup. Ct. 1954); Hill v. Hill, 199 Misc. 1035, 104 N.Y.S.2d
755 (Sup. Ct. 1951). See also In the Matter of Feuer Transp., Inc., 295 N.Y. 87,
65 N.E.2d 178 (1946); In the Matter of Lipschutz, 304 N.Y. 58, 63-65, 106 N.E.2d
8, 11 (1952) (dictum). The California Supreme Court, operating under a statute
based on the New York act, see note 9 supra, seems to have taken public policy into
consideration in denying confirmation of the award in Black v. Cutter Labs., 43
Cal. 2d 788, 798-99, 278 P.2d 905, 911-12 (1955), cert. dismised, 351 U.S. 292 (1956).
For analysis of the use of nonstatutory grounds in the New York-type arbitration
statutes, see generally Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude,
45 CORNELL L.Q. 519 (1960); Note, supra note 7. Jones, supra note 9, at 425-35,
after concluding that the New York courts have adopted nonstatutory policy considerations, indicates that other jurisdictions with New York-type statutes have
tended to take the same course. Note that the Michigan and Mississippi statutes
that are otherwise based on the New York act contain provisions that the statute
should not be construed to deny equitable jurisdiction over awards. MicH. Comnl.
LAws § 645.22 (1948); Miss. CODE ANN. §297 (1956). This might be construed
to provide for equitable discretion in confirmation of awards granting specific performance.
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hand, an award was confirmed that granted an injunction in a labor dispute
without making such findings as by statute the courts were compelled to
make before granting such an injunction; 14 also confirmed was an order
that the losing party pay the winning party's compensatory costs. 15 And
In the Matter of Staklinski,'6 on which the instant case relies,' 7 confirmed
an award directing specific performance of an employment contract, the
court finding no controlling public policy which would require vacating the
award.
If, as the court assumes, the lower court may in its discretion confirm
or vacate arbitration awards of specific performance,'
some guidelines
would be helpful-if not, indeed, necessary-for the consistent judicial
exercise of that discretion. Whatever those standards may be, they are not
limited to the statutory grounds, for the New York courts have, in addition to those statutory grounds, employed malleable notions of public policy
as reasons for refusing to confirm arbitration awards.' 9 Nor are those
criteria identical with the traditional equity grounds for refusing specific
performance, for the court of appeals has stated that the mere fact that
the courts would not as an original matter grant specific performance is
not in itself a sufficient ground for nonconfirmation of an arbitrator's
award.20 But between these two extremes, the court has not delineated the
grounds on which modification or vacation might be granted. 2 1 Clearly
the statute was intended to relieve the parties from compliance with rules
of procedure and some of the burdens of substantive law.2 2 But just as
clearly it was not intended to permit the enforcement of illegal, unconscionable, impossible, or nonjusticiable awards. If these categories are
14In the Matter of Ruppert, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129, 170 N.Y.S.2d 785
(1958).
15 In the Matter of East India Trading Co., 280 App. Div. 420, 114 N.Y.S.2d
93 (1952), aff'd without opinion, 305 N.Y. 866, 114 N.E.2d 213 (1953). Compare
In the Matter of East India Trading Co., supra, with Publishers' Ass'n v. Newspaper
& Mail Deliverers' Ass'n, 280 App. Div. 500, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1952).
166 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959).
17 Instant case at 136, 168 N.E.2d at 378, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 304-05.
18 The court of appeals made the "large assumption" that the trial court had
discretion to refuse to confirm the award on the facts of the instant case. However,
it appears that the lower court did not in fact exercise discretion, but rather felt
compelled to confirm the award. If what the court of appeals did was to enunciate
a rule of lower court discretion, perhaps the proper disposition would have been to
remand the case so that the lower court could exercise its discretion. The fact that
this was not done, along with the lack of any attempt to state criteria for the exercise
of discretion, leads to the belief that the court felt that confirmation of the award
was compelled on the facts of the instant case; however, since the lower court's
confirmation could be affirmed on the narrower basis of discretionary action, the court
of appeals limited itself to that basis.
19 See notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text.
20 See In the Matter of Staklinski, 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d
541 (1959); In the Matter of Ruppert, 3 N.Y.2d 576, 148 N.E.2d 129, 170 N.Y.S.2d
785 (1958).
21 One exception exists: the court of appeals has held that illegal awards will
not be confirmed. In the Matter of Western Union Tel. Co., 299 N.Y. 177, 86
N.E.2d
162 (1949) (alternative holding).
22
See Sandford Laundry, Inc. v. Simon, 285 N.Y. 488, 495, 35 N.E.2d 182, 186
(1941) ; In the Matter of Staklinsld, 6 App. Div. 2d 565, 569-70, 180 N.Y.S.2d 20,
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broadly defined, they will encompass most, if not all, cases in which awards
have been vacated as well as provide guidance for arbitrators in shaping
future awards.2 3 Thus an award may be illegal either because it enforces
an illegal contract provision 24 or because, although effectuating a legal
provision, it does so by ordering a result which would produce or sanction
a violation of the legal order.2 5 Unconscionable awards also have a dual
aspect: unconscionability may derive from the harshness of the original
27
bargain 26 or from the extreme harshness of the award.

Where the

severity of the award results from the fact that it continues a frictionproducing relationship, this circumstance militates toward denial of confirmation where adequate alternative remedies are present.2 8 Nor should
26 (1958), aff'd, 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959); In the
Matter of Spectrum Fabrics Corp., 285 App. Div. 710, 714, 139 N.Y.S.2d 612, 617,
aff'd, 309 N.Y. 709, 128 N.E.2d 416 (1955). Cf. 1 Bo,.a OF STATUTORY CONSOLIDATION,
REPORT ON THE SIMLCATION OF THE CIVIL PRAcTIcE OF NEW Yox 244 (1915)

(note 69).
23 It may be argued that by enunciating nonstatutory grounds for vacating or
modifying awards, the conclusiveness of arbitration awards would be destroyed and
the proverbial flood gates of litigation opened. It does not in fact seem likely that
such a step would greatly decrease the voluntary compliance with awards. See
KELLOR, ARBITRATI o IN AcTION 139 n.2 (1941) (only six per cent of commercial
arbitrations filed with courts for entry of judgment). On the contrary, the use of
amorphous "public policy" to vacate awards would seem more conducive to provoking
litigation than would more definite criteria; once the standards of confirmation are
known, the arbitrators can form their awards accordingly. See AmERiCAN ARBITRATiON Ass'N, CODE OF ARBITRATION chs. 6, 8 (Kellor ed. 1931), and KELLOR, op.
cit. sipra ch. 9, for illustrations of arbitrators' concern about conforming arbitration
to the judicial criteria for enforcement. Furthermore, even if litigation were increased,
it is doubtful that this fact alone should be regarded as sufficient reason for abstaining
from the enunciation of standards which awards must meet if they are to be confirmed.
24 See In the Matter of Harold Levinsohn Corp., 273 App. Div. 469, 78 N.Y.S.2d
171 (1948), rev'd on other grounds, 299 N.Y. 454, 87 N.E.2d 510 (1949).
25 See In the Matter of Western Union Tel. Co., 299 N.Y. 177, 86 N.E.2d 162
(1949) (alternative holding). It has also been noted that where the award affects
those beyond the contracting parties, a decision-maker responsible to all those affected
is essential. See Jones, supra note 9, at 437. This seems to be the rationale of the
denial of enforcement of agreements to arbitrate disputes concerning the custody
of children. In the Matter of Michelman, 5 Misc. 2d 570, 135 N.Y.S.2d 608 (Sup.
Ct 1954); Hill v. Hill, 199 Misc. 1035, 104 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1951). Effects
on those beyond the parties as well as official state interest may be evidenced by
statutory provisions. Conflict of the award and the policy of any such provisions
should obviously be considered on a motion to confirm the award. See Note, 109
U. PA. L. REv. 224, 235-36 (1960), commenting on In the Matter of Staklinski, 6
N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959).
26 For the rule that equity will not specifically enforce unconscionable bargains,
see, e.g., Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948) ; Scheinberg v.

Scheinberg, 249 N.Y. 277, 164 N.E. 98 (1928); 4

POMsEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE

§ 1405a (5th ed. 1941) ; 5 WVIILISTON, CONTRACTS § 1425, at 3990 (rev. ed. 1937).
27 Cf. Note, Unconscionable Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code,
109 U. PA. L. REv. 401, 415 (1961).
28 The usual alternative remedy would be damages. But see cases cited note 36
infra where the extension of a distasteful relationship was avoided by the use of
other remedies. Insofar as the equitable doctrine requiring the inadequacy of damages as a prerequisite for specific performance is applied to situations where an
unwanted relationship would be perpetuated, the doctrine would seem applicable to
confirmation of arbitration awards.

But where it is not a matter of a continuing

relationship, e.g., the transfer of a chattel, the parties should be able to avoid the
inadequacy-of-damages limitation on judicial relief by agreeing to arbitration.
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a decree which is either physically or financially impossible of performance
be confirmed. 29 And lastly, where the arbitrators have ordered specific
performance of an act, the nature of which is such that the court cannot
reasonably determine whether the award has been carried out, the court
should no more confirm the award than decree specific performance itself; 30
even if the arbitrators thought themselves competent to judge performance,
once the award is confirmed it becomes the court's duty to enforce it.31
None of these factors is present in the instant case,3 2 and-given the
arbitration statute's strong policy toward confirmation 3 3 -there is no
reason to deny the parties the right to have their chosen forum decide by
their chosen rules. 34 Neither the original contract nor the arbitration result
is in any way illegal. The contract was not unconscionable at its inception
and, although the award may lead to a friction-producing relationship, the
inadequacy of any alternative remedy under the construction-and-lease
arrangement requires enforcement of specific performance. 35 Were this
an ordinary construction contract, plaintiff could have recovered damages
29 See AmERICAN ARBiTRATION Ass'N, op. cit. supra note 23, at 157, and KELLOR,
op. cit. supra note 23, at 123, for an awareness that the award must be reasonably
possible of performance.
30 This classification would include those cases that involve a real difficulty of
supervision over many detailed acts during a long period of time, as well as those
resting on subjective or aesthetic standards of performance.
31 See instant case at 140, 168 N.E.2d at 380, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 308 (dissenting
opinion). It appears that under New York law a future breach could be brought
to arbitration rather than to the courts if the party for whose benefit the award is
confirmed
so wishes. See note 51 infra.
32
Absent also, of course, are any of the statutory grounds for modification or
vacation that are primarily concerned with the integrity of the arbitral process. See
notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text.
33 In the Matter of Staklinski, 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541
(1959); In the Matter of Spectrum Fabrics Corp., 285 App. Div. 710, 714, 139
N.Y.S.2d 612, 617, aff'd, 309 N.Y. 709, 128 N.E.2d 416 (1955) ; Jones, mtpra note 9,
at 437. Cf. In the Matter of Lipschutz, 304 N.Y. 58, 106 N.E.2d 8 (1952) ; Fudickar
v. Guardian Mut. Life Ins. Co., 62 N.Y. 392, 399-401 (1875). Where the courts
have frustrated the policy of arbitration they have been severely criticized. See
Jalet, supra note 13; Jones, supra note 9, at 437; Comment, 21 U. Cni. L. REv. 719
Perhaps some of this adverse
(1954); Comment, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 148 (1953).
criticism is directed toward interference with the arbitral process on a seemingly
irrational basis-irrational because not based on enunciated standards.
34 Cf. Jones, supra note 9, at 437.
35 On the question of whether an alternative remedy is adequate, consider In the
Matter of Staklinsld, 6 N.Y.2d 159, 160 N.E.2d 78, 188 N.Y.S.2d 541 (1959), under
the classification set forth at notes 23-30 supra and accompanying text. There, the
award commanded that a potentially friction-producing, indefinite, personal relationship be continued. Unless this could be justified by the fact that damages were
extremely inadequate, confirmation should have been denied; it was arguable, however,
that damages were inadequate inasmuch as Staklinski was seeking not only just
remuneration but also the right to remain active in a corporation of which he had
been president. Staklinski presents other difficulties as well: first, if Staklinski did
in fact desire to remain active and not merely draw a salary would there have been
compliance with the award by giving him a title and compensation but no duties?
And second, there was a conflict between the award and the statutory policy that the
board of directors of a corporation have the power to remove an officer at will.
N.Y. STOCK CORP. LAws § 60. See Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 224, 235-36 (1960).
For the equitable rule against the specific enforcement of employment contracts, see
Fitzpatrick v. Michael, 177 Md. 248, 9 A.2d 639 (1939) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 379, comment d, illustration 2 (1932) ; 5 WMLLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1423a (rev. ed.
1937).
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and had the construction work performed by another. But under the
lease arrangement 3 6 refusal to grant specific performance would preclude
the respondent from operating a strategically located department store.37
Furthermore, even if monetary damages could be regarded as sufficient,
their accurate calculation would be difficult due to the length of the lease
and such other conjectural factors as the development of the area and the
future value of a shopping center location.38 As to impossibility, the court
of appeals limited its consideration to physical or legal impossibility; 39
however, it would seem that the arbitrators determined that performance
was financially possible 4" and this factual determination, once made, was
41
binding on the court.
While the traditional and historical rationale 42 for equity's refusal
to grant specific performance of construction contracts 43 has been the
36The most common type of inadequate damages situation in construction contracts exists where the defendant is in possession of the land on which the work is
to be done. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §361(c) (1932). But see Municipal
Gas Co. v. Lone Star Gas Co., 259 S.W. 684 (Tex. Civ. App. 1924), affd, 117 Tex.
331, 3 S.W.2d 790 (1928). In particular situations, courts have been able to settle
this problem. without commanding the defendant to build. See McCormick v. Proprietors of Cemetery, 285 Mass. 548, 189 N.E. 585 (1934) ; Gordon v. Hewlett Harbor
Constr., Inc., 198 Misc. 679, 100 N.Y.S.2d 857 (Sup. Ct 1950); Rector. of St. David's
v. Wood, 24 Ore. 396, 34 Pac. 18 (1893). But see Carlson v. Len Home Builders,
Inc., 132 N.J. Eq. 38, 26 A.2d 576 (Ch. 1942).
37 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 361(c) (1932).
Cf. M. M. & D. D. Brown
v. Western Md. Ry., 84 W. Va. 271, 276, 99 S.E. 457, 459 (1919).
38 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcTs §361 (a) (1932).
Cf. Lawrence v. Saratoga
Lake Ry., 36 Hun 467, 474 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1885). Also tending toward the granting
of specific performance is the public interest involved in obtaining a large department
store for a particular community. See 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1172, at 747 (1951).
Cf. Municipal Gas Co. v. Lone Star Gas Co., 259 S.W. 684, 691 (Tex. Civ. App.
1924),
aff'd, 117 Tex. 331, 3 S.W.2d 790 (1928).
39
Instant case at 137, 168 N.E.2d at 378, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 305-06.
40 The dissent's argument that the arbitrators granted specific performance pro
forma without considering the financial possibility of performance, instant case at
143, 108 N.E.2d at 382, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 310-11, is not supported by the lower court's
finding that "extensive hearings were held; both parties were afforded and did take
the opportunity of presenting their respective evidence and arguments. Alleged
impossibility of performance due to the tight mortgage money market, was the
crux of the controversy." In the Matter of Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 9 Misc.
2d 796, 797, 168 N.Y.S.2d 513, 514 (Sup. Ct 1957). The granting of an extension
of time for performance, see Brief for Petitioners, pp. 7-8, shows an awareness of the
issue by the arbitrators.
41 See note 7 supra; Pine St Realty Co. v. Coutrolous, 233 App. Div. 404, 253
N.Y. Supp. 174 (1931), appeal denied, 258 N.Y. 609, 80 N.E. 354 (1932). The rule
that the arbitrators' findings of fact are binding on the court is particularly appropriate here as the three arbitrators (a bank vice president, the president of a real
estate firm, and an architect, see Brief for Petitioners, p. 6) seem more qualified
than the usual court to determine whether appellant could perform his contractual
obligation.
42
Pound, The Progress of the Law, 1918-19 Equity, 33 HxAv. L. REv. 420, 433-35
(1920); see Olec, Specific Performance of Contracts Through Arbitration, 6 Ann.
J. (n.s.) 163 (1951). Cf. SToNE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAw 546 (1950).
43 See, e.g., Beck v. Allison, 56 N.Y. 366 (1874) ; 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1172
(1951); Oleck, Specific Performance of Builders' Contracts, 21 FORDHAm L. REv.
156-58 (1952) ; 4 POmEROY, op. cit. supra note 26, § 1402, at 1038-39; 5 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 1423 (rev. ed. 1937). But the rule against specific performance of construction contracts does not deny equitable jurisdiction; it is only a guide for equity's
discretion. See, e.g., Queens Plaza Amusements, Inc. v. Queens Bridge Realty
Corp., 265 App. Div. 1057, 39 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1943); Strauss v. Estates of Long
Beach, 187 App. Div. 876, 176 N.Y. Supp. 447 (1919); M. M. & D. D. Brown v.
Western Md. Ry., 84 W. Va. 271, 99 S.E. 457 (1919).

750

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.109

"difficulty of enforcement," 44 it appears that this difficulty is more imagined
than real. 45 The current trend of the law is toward specifically enforcing
construction contracts where the plans and specifications are reasonably
46
Although previous cases granting
certain and damages inadequate.
specific performance of construction contracts do not involve as large a
47
project as does the instant case, the difficulty of enforcement here does
48
An expert witness testified that the connot seem extremely imposing.
44 See e.g., Beck v. Allison, supra note 43, at 370-71; Oleck, supra note 43, at
157. But see 2 STORY, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 1006-07 (rule put exclusively on the
existence of an adequate remedy at law).
45 English courts have formulated exceptions to the nonenforcement rule where
the specifications are definite and certain, there is no adequate remedy at law, and
the defendant has obtained possession of the land on which the work is to be done.
Mayor of Wolverhampton v. Emmons, [1901] 1 K.B. 515, 525. See 4 POMEROY,
op. cit. vupra note 26, § 1042, at 1038-39. These exceptions were accepted by an
American court in Ward v. Newbold, 115 Md. 689, 81 Atl. 793 (1911) (dictum),
indicating that the factors are alternative and the existence of any one of them is
sufficient to grant specific performance. This view would make possible the specific

performance of any construction contract, without regard to the adequacy of damages,
so long as it meets the test of sufficient certainty. For an argument in favor of this
position, see 2 STORY, op. cit. supra note 7, § 1009. But see note 28 supra and accompanying text. It would seem, however, that the exceptions cannot be completely
alternative as sufficient certainty would be a necessity in all cases.
46 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1423, at 3977 (rev. ed. 1937). See Brummel v.
Clifton Realty Co., 146 Md. 56, 125 Atl. 905 (1924); Jones v. Parker, 163 Mass.
564, 40 N.E. 1044 (1895); Zygmunt v. Avenue Realty Co., 108 N.J. Eq. 462, 155
Atl. 544 (Ch. 1931) ; Strauss v. Estates of Long Beach, 187 App. Div. 876, 176 N.Y.
Supp. 447 (1919); Lawrence v. Saratoga Lake Ry., 36 Hun 467 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1885); Stuyvesant v. Mayor of City of New York, 11 Paige 414 (N.Y. Ch. 1845);
Keys v. Alligood, 178 N.C. 16, 100 S.E. 113 (1919); McDonough v. Southern Ore.
Mining Co., 177 Ore. 136, 159 P.2d 829 (1945); M. M. & D. D. Brown v. Western
Md. Ry., 84 W. Va. 271, 99 S.E. 457 (1919); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §371,
comment a (1932); Oleck, supra note 43, at 157-59. Cf. Busey v. McCurley, 61
Md. 436 (1884); Doty v. Rensselaer County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 194 App. Div. 841,
185 N.Y. Supp. 466 (1921); Backes v. Curran, 69 App. Div. 188, 74 N.Y. Supp. 723
(1902). But see Queens Plaza Amusements, Inc. v. Queens Bridge Realty Corp.,
22 Misc. 2d 315, 36 N.Y.S.2d 326 (1942), rev'd on other grounds, 265 App. Div.
1057, 39 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1943) ; 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1423, at 3977 (rev. ed. 1937).
47 See cases cited note 46 supra. But see Backes v. Curran, 69 App. Div. 188, 74
N.Y. Supp. 723 (1902) (building to contain store for claimant's use); Mayor of
Wolverhampton v. Emmons, [1901] 1 K.B. 515 (eight houses). In Queens Plaza
Amusements, Inc. v. Queens Bridge Realty Corp., 265 App. Div. 1057, 39 N.Y.S.2d
463 (1943), the court, reversing the lower court on other grounds, refused to consider
whether specific performance should have been granted of a contract to construct a
theater under a lease arrangement. See also Klingbeil v. Becklengberg, 249 Ill. App.
39 (1928), where the court indicated in dictum that it might grant specific performance of a contract to build a hotel (rent of $1,100,000 for a twenty-five year
lease) if the lessee had not been in possession.
48 Although the dissent, instant case at 140-41, 168 N.E.2d at 380, 202 N.Y.S.2d
at 308-09, speaks of the uncertainty of the contract, see RETATEMENT, CONTRACTS
§ 370 (1932), and notes 29, 46 supra and accompanying text, the specifications are
sufficiently certain for enforcement. See instant case at 136-37, 168 N.E.2d at 378,
202 N.Y.S.2d at 305. In Jones v. Parker, 163 Mass. 564, 40 N.E. 1044 (1895),
Justice Holmes indicated that the certainty necessary for specific performance is
no greater than that required in an action for damages at law. Cf. Lawrence v.
Saratoga Lake Ry., 36 Hun 467, 473 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1885). But see RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 370, comment b (1932) ("may be" cases where too uncertain for specific
performance but not for damages). Where the need for specific performance has
been present, courts have enforced contracts that seem less than indubitably certain.
See, e.g., Jones v. Parker, mtpra; Zygmunt v. Avenue Realty Co., 108 N.J. Eq. 462,
155 Atl. 544 (Ch. 1931); Backes v. Curran, 69 App. Div. 188, 74 N.Y. Supp. 723
(1902); Mayor of Wolverhampton v. Emmons, [1901] 1 K.B. 515. See generally
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struction would take from nine months to a year,49 and courts have enforced contracts requiring continuous acts over much longer periods of
time. 50 The court would not have to manage the construction work; it
would merely determine breaches of the contract upon proper application
of a party-the same issue which confronts it in a legal action for damages. 51
The extra burden on the court, then, does not consist of more work at any
specific point but rather lies in the fact that by keeping the contract alive
instead of ending it by damages, the possibility of future litigation is kept
open.5 2 This possibility, however, does not constitute sufficient cause to
53
deny adequate protection to a contracting party.

Busey v. McCurley, 61 Md. 436 (1884) ; 5 CORBIN, CONRACTS § 1174 (1951) (courts
have exaggerated the need for certainty); STONE, op. cit. supra note 44, at 546;
5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1424, at 3989 (rev. ed. 1937) ("probable that the difficulty

uncertainty has been overemphasized").
regarding
49
Brief for Petitioners, pp. 29-30.
50 See, e.g., Schmidt v. Louisville & N.R.R., 101 Ky. 441, 41 S.W. 1015 (1897)

(thirty years); Prospect Park & C.I.R.R. v. Coney Island & B.R.R., 144 N.Y. 152,
39 N.E. 17 (1894) (twenty-five years); Southern Ry. v. Franklin & Pa. R.I , 96 Va.
693, 32 S.E. 485 (1899) (seventeen years).
In Brief for
51 See Jones v. Parker, 163 Mass. 564, 40 N.E. 1044 (1895).
Petitioner, pp. 17-18, it was argued that if the defendant failed to perform according
to the contract terms, action for contempt under N.Y. JuD. LAW § 773 would be
used to compensate the petitioner; if no damages are proved, § 773 provides a maximum fine of the complainant's costs and expenses plus $250. However, under N.Y.
JUD. LAW § 774, if the defendant refused to perform that which was in its "power"
to perform, defendant's officers, if connected with the contemptuous action, could be
imprisoned until there was compliance with the contract. See Mayor of New York
v. New York & Staten Island Ferry Co., 64 N.Y. 622 (1876); Schreiber v. Schomaker Piano Forte Mfg. Co., 152 App. Div. 817, 137 N.Y. Supp. 747 (1912); In re
See
Westminster Realty Corp., 123 App. Div. 797, 108 N.Y. Supp. 551 (1908).
generally Village of Haverstraw v. Eckerson, 158 App. Div. 419, 143 N.Y. Supp.
667 (1913). Financial, as distinguished from legal or physical, impossibility of performance may not be sufficient to prevent contempt imprisonment under § 774. Coinpare People ex rel. Dean v. Markell, 72 Misc. 427, 131 N.Y. Supp. 383 (Sup. Ct
1911), with Maguire v. Heraty, 163 Pa. 381, 30 Atl. 151 (1894). The dissent in
the instant case at 143, 168 N.E.2d at 382, 202 N.Y.S.2d at 311, argues that by
granting specific performance here the court would determine damages for later
breach under § 773, and thus would be thwarting the intention of the parties to have
any damages determined by arbitration. But the fact that a later breach by the
defendant could be the subject of a statutory contempt action for damages does not
necessarily preclude the petitioner from seeking arbitration of the alleged breach;
it would seem only to deny the defendant the right to insist on arbitration if the
petitioner desires to bring a contempt action. See Joseph Reidel Glass Works, Inc.
v. Francis W. Kurtz & Co., 260 App. Div. 163, 20 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1940) (dictum).
More important is the fact that the parties intended performance of the contract,
not damages. See M. M. & D. D. Brown v. Western Md. Ry., 84 W. Va. 271, 276,
They also intended that all questions arising from the
99 S.E. 457, 459 (1919).
contract, presumably including remedies for breach, be decided by arbitration.
Thwarting arbitration at this juncture on the possibility that a contrary result might
deprive the arbitrators of jurisdiction in a future, conjectural dispute does not comport
with5 either
the intention of the parties or the public policy supporting arbitration.
2
See Nakdimen v. Atkinson Improvement Co., 149 Ark. 448, 458, 233 S.W.
694, 697 (1921) : "There would be no limit to the number of times the court might
be called on during the life of the [ten-year] lease to say whether the appellants have
performed their duties faithfully or efficiently."
53 "The idea of the dignity and leisure of a court of equity which once obtained
is out of place in a system of government in which service to the public rather than
personal comfort is the real test of the dignity of the courts. Courts of equity now
consider more the results that might follow the denial of a decree for specific performance than the time and labor required of the court to enforce such specific
performance." Municipal Gas Co. v. Lone Star Gas Co., 259 S.W. 684, 690 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1924), aff'd, 117 Tex. 331, 3 S.W.2d 790 (1928).
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MAINTAIn RESIDENOE In EIECToA1A
DISTRICT MAY DEDUCT
PENSE OF APARTMENT WHERm COURT SITS

To
Ex-

Taxpayer, a Louisiana supreme court justice, kept a home in his
electoral district seventy-five miles from New Orleans, the city in which
the court was required by law to sit; during the nine-month court term
he lived in a New Orleans apartment which was rented on a yearly basis.'
A claimed income tax deduction for the away-from-home travel expense
of maintaining the apartment was denied by the Commissioner, and taxpayer paid the resulting deficiency assessment. In an action for refund,
the Fifth Circuit, in a picturesque opinion, affirmed the decision of the
district court, which had found that the state constitution required the
maintenance of the electoral district residence and had allowed the claimed
deduction in full.2 United States v. Le Blanc, 278 F.2d 571 (5th Cir. 1960).
Although personal living expenses are generally nondeductible items,3
the Internal Revenue Code specifies an exception to this rule for "ordinary
and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business, including . . . traveling expenses (includ-

ing the entire amount expended for meals and lodging) while away from
home in the pursuit of a trade or business . . . ., 4 In cases almost factually indistinguishable from the instant case, two district courts have
construed "home" to mean the taxpayer's residence. 5 However, the Internal Revenue Service 6 and a majority of cases 7 have glossed "home" as
meaning "principal place of business." The Supreme Court avoided consideration of the word's meaning in Commissioner v. Flowers by holding
that traveling expenses which were not the result of business exigency
were not deductible," and again in Peurifoy v. Commissioner by finding
1 It was necessary for the judge to sign a year's lease in order to secure suitable

lodgings. United States v. Le Blanc, 278 F.2d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 1960).
2 Le Blanc v. United States, 4 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 5015 (E.D. La. 1959).
3 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 262.
4 INT. REV. CODE

OF 1954, § 162(a) (2).

The instant case was governed by Int.

Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 289, §23(a) (1) (A), 52 Stat 460, which does not differ
from the present provision. The deduction first appeared in Revenue Act of 1921,
ch. 136, § 214(a) (1), 42 Stat. 239. Congress has carved out a specific exception for
its own members, IxT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162(a); other public officials are not
distinguished from persons carrying on a "trade or business." See INT. REv. CODE OF
1954, § 7701 (a) (26).
5 Moss v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 10 (W.D.S.C. 1956); Emmert v. United

States,
146 F. Supp. 322 (S.D. Ind. 1955).
6
E.g., Rev. Rul. 60-314, 1960 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 40, at 9.
7
E.g., Luke O'Toole, 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 667 (1956), aff'd per curiam,
243 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1957); George W. Lindsay, 34 B.T.A. 840 (1936); Mort L.
Bixler, 5 B.T.A. 1181, 1184 (1927). Contra, e.g., Flowers v. Commissioner, 148
F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'd on other grounds, 326 U.S. 465 (1946) ; Wallace v.
Commissioner, 144 F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1944); Schreiner v. McCrory, 186 F. Supp.
819 (D. Neb. 1960); Robert S. Shelley, 4 CCH Tax Ct Mem. 668 (1945); Peurifoy
v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59, 61 (dissent).
8 326 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1946) : "We deem it unnecessary to enter into or decide
this conflict [concerning the interpretation of home]. . . . [T]he expenses were not
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that the case did not require decision on that point.9 The principal place
of business interpretation has been further refined in those cases where taxpayer had two or more bases of business operation. Considering the relative amounts of time spent at and income allocable to each location as determinative of the principal place of business, deduction has been allowed
for those expenses incurred while away from this location,10 without regard
to taxpayer's nominal place of residence. 1 Further distinction has been
made to allow travel expense deduction for the pursuit of "temporary"but not "indefinite" 1'2 -employment away from the statutory "home." 13
The present case suggests a helpful approach to other travel expense
cases by attaching a more literal construction to "home"-the area of taxpayer's residence 14-and granting deductibility for only those expenditures required to be made for business purposes. The Fifth Circuit might
have taken the usual approach of labeling New Orleans the judge's principal place of business-and therefore his home-so that the claimed expenses would not be incurred "away from home." But equating home
with place of business is justifiable only as a means of preventing travel
expense deductions by taxpayers who maintain their residences away from
incurred in the pursuit of business . . . ." Some cases have construed Flowers
as excluding the deductibility of traveling expenses required by the taxpayer'srather than his employer's-business. See Commissioner v. Janss, 260 F.2d 99,
103-04 (8th Cir. 1957); Commissioner v. Peurifoy, 254 F.2d 483, 486 (4th Cir.
1957), aff'd per curiam, 358 U.S. 59 (1958). Flowers supplies no basis for this
construction, Comment, 33 So. CAL. L. REv. 307, 310-12 (1960), and it is highly
unlikely that the Commissioner will rely on such a limited rule, see Rev. Rul. 60-189,
1960 NT. Rxv. BULL. No. 20, at 12, 17-18.
9358 U.S. 59, 60 (1958) (per curiam). But see id. at 62 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2 (1958) also avoids the question.
19E.g., Ney v. United States, 171 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 967 (1949); Burns v. Gray, 5 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 418 (D. Ky. 1960); Robert
F. Green, 12 T.C. 656 (1949); Rev. Rul. 604, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 49; Rev. Rul.
109, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 261, 262; Rev. Rul. 497, 1954-2 Cum. BuLL. 75; Rev. Rul.
147, 1954-1 Cum. BULL. 51; IRS Pub. No. 300, 2 CCH 1961 STAND. FED. TAX REP.
1[1352.01.
"William E. Hicks, 9 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 1088 (1950) ; Rev. Rul. 604, 1955-2
Cum. BULL. 49; Rev. Rul. 497, 1954-2 Cum. Bu.. 75; Rev. Rul. 147, 1954-1 Cum.
BULL. 51.
l 2 E.g., compare Harry F. Schurer, 3 T.C. 544 (1944), acq., 1944-1 CuM. BULL.
24, with Floyd Garlock, 34 T.C. 611 (1960). The distinction is stated: "it is essential
that the employment away from the established tax home shall be temporary in contemplation at the time of its acceptance and not indeterminate in fact as it develops."
Commissioner v. Peurifoy, 254 F.2d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1957), aff'd per curiam,
358 U.S. 59 (1958); but cf. Harvey v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir.
1960). See generally Johnson, Tax on Worker's Travel Still Not Settled; New
Rev. Rul. Not Final Answer, 13 J. TAXATION 206 (1960) ; 107 U. PA. L. REv. 871
(1959). The line of demarcation will tend to be drawn at one year. See Rev. Rul.
60-189, 1960 INT. REv. BULL. No. 20, at 12, 14; 44 CORNELL L.Q. 270, 276-77 &
nn.33-34 (1959).
13 Rev. Rul. 60-189, 1960 INT. REv. BULL. No. 20, at 12, 15; see Michael J.
Carroll, 20 T.C. 382 (1953); Harry F. Schurer, 3 T.C. 544 (1944), acq., 1944-1
Cum. BULL. 24; Coburn v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 763, 764-65 (2d Cir. 1943)
(alternative holding); 4 MERTENs, FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATION § 25.93 (1960).
14 The expense of commuting is nondeductible in any event. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 470 (1946); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(e) (1958).
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their places of business for nonbusiness reasons. 15 This equation would
be unnecessary if home were given its literal meaning and if the conceptual
problem created by the separation of residence and employment were
squarely faced by allowing deductions only for business-required expenses 16
17
-a scheme easily elicited by negative implication from Flowers.
Had the Fifth Circuit chosen to adhere to the place-of-business approach, taxpayer might still have received some relief by way of the two
business doctrine. Though maintenance of a residence in his home district
was a condition of taxpayer's employment, the greater amount of his time
was spent in New Orleans, and that city would have been his principal
place of business.' 8
Applying the two business doctrine, lodging expenses at the electoral district home would have been at least partially
deductible.' 9 This approach represents an avenue out of the confusion
which results under the place of business definition when each business
location can be termed both "home" and "away from home." While time
spent and income earned at each location are purportedly equally significant
criteria for ascertaining the major place of business,

20

in fact time alone

has controlled decided cases."- This emphasis on physical presence makes
the justification for the two business doctrine similar to the rationale of
the place of business definition: each tends to preclude a deduction for
lodging costs which do not result from the requirements of business, inasmuch as a taxpayer will most likely reside in the area where the greatest
amount of his working time is spent if his choice is not motivated by purely
personal reasons.2 2 Like the place of business definition, the two business
rule would be unnecessary if "home" were literally interpreted and deductions were allowed only for expenses incurred because of the exigencies of
business.
Similarly, the "temporary or indefinite" dichotomy-as an exception
to the principal place of business test --- fits within the idea that business
15 See Barnhill v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 913, 917 (4th Cir. 1945); Ernest T.
Laubscher, 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1025, 1028 (1944); McDonald, Travel and Entertainment Expenses, N.Y.U. 11TH INST. ON FED. TAx 1173, 1174-75 (1953); The
Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84, 194 (1959); Comment, 19 U. Cm.
L. REv. 534, 535 (1952); Note, 55 YALE L.J. 603, 604-05 (1946); 32 CORNELL L.Q.
451, 453 (1947) ; Rev. Rul. 497, 1954-2 Cu. BULL. 75, 76.
'6fThe Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84, 194 (1959) ; 19 U. CmI.
L. REv. 534, 535-36 (1952) ; Note, 55 YALE L.J. 603, 607-08 (1946).
17 See text accompanying note 8 supra.
18 See text accompanying note 10 supra. The time factor would be the sole determinant since the amount of income earned cannot be allocated.
19 Some allocation might be made between the business and personal aspects of
this expense. See, e.g., Ralph E. Duncan, 30 T.C. 386 (1958) ; DeWitt K. Burnham,
17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 240 (1958); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(b) (1958). However, a
court might have difficulty with the verbal incongruity of calling the district home a
place of business.
20 See note 10 mpra and accompanying text.
21 See cases cited note 10 supra; Joseph H. Sherman, 16 T.C. 332 (1951);
Helen Stairwalt, 11 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 902 (1952). But see Vincent Treanor,
10 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 336, 339-40 (1951).
22 See S. M. R. O'Hara, 6 T.C. 841, 846-48 (1946) (concurring opinion).
23 See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
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exigency is the controlling standard of travel expense deductibility.2 4 A
taxpayer who accepts temporary employment in another area cannot reasonably be expected to relocate his home; but if the employment is of an
indefinite duration, failure to bring together place of residence and place of
employment will probably-depending on reasonable expectations as to the
length of the employment 2 5 -have been occasioned by nonbusiness
reasons.

26

Cases in which the principal place of business definition has been attached to "home" have, for the most part, been in accord with a business
exigency rationale. There are, however, two notable exceptions. If a
taxpayer pursues an "indefinite" employment which is of such a nature or
which is to be performed at such a location that he must leave his family
behind, resort to place of business as the base point will operate to deny
travel expense deductions 27 -despite the fact that his added costs may be
necessitated by the exigencies of business. And conversely, an itinerant
who has no permanent residence but rather "must carry his home on his
back" 28 may be granted the deduction by labeling his employer's place of
business as "home."

29

If awkwardness of construction were the only ob-

(per curiam), the
24 In
Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59, 60 (1958)
temporary-indefinite dichotomy was characterized as an exception to the test of
business exigency. This was criticized in The Supreme Court, 1958 Term, 73 HARv.
L. REv. 84, 196 (1959).
(dissent).
25 See Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59, 61, 62 n.4 (1958)
Harvey v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 491, 495 (9th Cir. 1960), found this test superior
to the temporary-indefinite dichotomy for effectuating the business exigency rationale.
26 See Carragan v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1952); Andrews v.
Commissioner, 179 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1950) ; James E. Peurifoy, 27 T.C. 149 (1956),
rev'd, 254 F.2d 483 (4th Cir. 1957), aff'd, 358 U.S. 59 (1958)
(per curiam);
Kermit L. Claunch, 29 T.C. 1047, 1053 (1958) (Atkins, J., dissenting), aff'd, 264
F2d 309 (5th Cir. 1959) ; McDonald, supra note 15, at 1179-81; The Supreme Court,
1958 Term, 73 HARV. L. REv. 84, 194-96 (1959). In Wallace v. Commissioner, 144
F.2d 407 (9th Cir. 1944), and in Coburn v. Commissioner, 138 F.2d 763 (2d Cir.
1943) (alternative holding), the courts held that "home" was to be construed
literally. Barnhill v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 913 (4th Cir. 1945)-where the court
adopted the principal place of business definition because of the business exigency
requirement--observed that, when limited to their precise facts, neither Coburn nor
Wallace is inconsistent with the principal place of business interpretation; the deductions allowed in those cases were for temporary employment. Id. at 916. If the
temporary-indefinite dichotomy is not considered a route to business exigency, it can
have no function but that of indicating when the principal place of business has
changed. See Harvey v. Commissioner, smpra note 25, at 495; Note, 43 VA. L. REv.
59, 66-67 (1957).
27james R. Whitaker, 24 T.C. 750, 754-55 (1955) (taxpayer not permitted to
take family to Greenland job site); A. Gilbert Formel, 9 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 782
(1950) (passport restrictions prevented taxpayer from taking family to job site in
Russia) ; Rev. Rul. 571, 1955-2 Cum. BULL. 44. Where it is difficult or impractical,
as opposed to impossible, for taxpayer to bring his family to the area of the job
site, courts have denied traveling expense deductions through application of the business exigency test. York v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 385 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (taxpayer could not find living accommodations for family immediately on starting work
in new area); F. J. McGinley. Jr., 15 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 641 (1956) (inferior
living conditions in Ankara, Turkey); Henry C. Warren, 13 T.C. 205 (1949)
(housing shortage) ; compare Chester D. Griesemer, 10 B.T.A. 386, acq., VII-1 CuM.
BULL. 13 (1928).
28 Peurifoy v. Commissioner, 358 U.S. 59, 62 (1958) (dissent).
29 See Charles G. Gustafson, 3 T.C. 998 (1944): Simeon J. Smith. 2 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 837 (1943); Howard Murphy, 1 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 757 (1943)
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jection to a nonliteral interpretation of "home," notions of stare decisis
or merely plain mental economy might argue for the retention of the
current rule of thumb. But when continued application leads to results
which are illogical when measured by the business exigency standard, the
place of business definition serves no useful purpose. The present case is
among the growing few to avoid entanglement with this fiction.

INSANITY-REiAsE

OF DEFENDANT ACQUITTED BECAuSE OF
INSANITY CONDITIONED UPON His REPORTING FOR FURTHER PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT

Defendant, who had a record of criminal activity,' had been indicted
for larceny, found by a medical examiner to be psychotic, adjudged by the
court not guilty by reason of insanity, and committed to a mental hospital.
Nearly two years later, a petition for discharge was presented to the
committing court, the superintendent of the hospital reporting that defendant "had made a satisfactory adjustment, was in good remission of
his mental illness, [and] had received the maximum benefits of hospitalization
.
2 The court ordered a ninety-day observation of defendant
which resulted in recommendations by three doctors that defendant be
discharged from further custody. The doctors found defendant not presently psychotic and concluded that he would not benefit from further
hospitalization; they observed, however, that he was likely to engage in
future antisocial behavior.
Apparently applying that provision of the
Pennsylvania Mental Health Act of 1951 entitling mental patients to release
upon recovery from their mental illness, 3 the court unconditionally discharged defendant from custody.

Almost immediately thereafter, a bench

warrant was issued and defendant was returned to custody because the
(by implication).
Contra, James v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 270 (D. Nev.
1959); Tenney v. Osborn, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 310 (1958); Moses Mitnick,
13 T.C. 1 (1949); I.T. 1497, 1-2 CuM. BULL. 89 (1922). For a discussion of the
inequity of granting itinerants deductions as well as that of denying them those deductions and of congressional intent on this problem, see 19 U. CHI. L. Rxv. 534, 538-42
(1952). In dealing with salesmen who have established residences, the courts have
adhered to the literal construction of home and the business exigency requirement.
See Schreiner v. McCrory, 186 F. Supp. 819 (D. Neb. 1960). In early cases such
as M. Lucas, 13 B.T.A. 642 (1928), and J. H. Armstrong, 6 B.T.A. 384 (1927), acq.,
VII-1 CuM. BULL. 2 (1928), where substantiation was the issue, the Commissioner
seems to have conceded that the expenses of traveling salesmen away from their
residences were deductible.
I Defendant, twenty-seven years old, had been arrested seven times, convicted
five, and sentenced four-all within the past eleven years. He was arrested for the
crime of larceny involved in the present matter four days after his release on parole
from a sentence of one to three years for aggravated robbery.
2 Commonwealth v. Jenldns, 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 413, 416 (Quar. Sess. 1960).

a PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1481(6) (1954).
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court believed, "on further consideration of the matter," 4 that a discharge
hearing was required under section 604 of the Mental Health Act. 5 At
this hearing, the court heard testimony from one of the three doctors to the
effect that defendant's sole problem was social maladjustment-stemming
from protracted absences from normal society-and that any repeated
criminal activity would stem from difficulties of readjustment rather than
from mental illness. The court then ordered defendant released, subject
indefinitely to the conditions of monthly observation by the neuropsychiatric
division of quarter sessions court and weekly outpatient treatment at the
Philadelphia General Hospital. Unjustified failure to report for treatment
was to result in revocation of the release. Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 21
Pa. D. & C.2d 413 (Quar. Sess. 1960).
Nearly every American jurisdiction vests statutory authority in its
courts to order the institutional commitment of persons acquitted by reason
of insanity.' In Pennsylvania, discretionary power to commit is provided
by the Mental Health Act of 1951.7

Pennsylvania release procedure is

governed by three statutes: the Parole Act of 1911, which empowers the
court to "parole" any acquitted and committed person upon any conditions deemed advisable by the court; 8 the Penal Proceedings Act of 1860,
which allows the trial court to release a person acquitted because of
insanity into the custody of friends or relatives upon the posting of a
bond for his future good behavior; 9 and the Mental Health Act of 1951.
4 Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 21 Pa. D. & C.2d 413, 417 (Quar. Sess. 1960). A
bench warrant is a common-law writ issued by certain authorized courts directing a
sheriff to arrest some individual in order to compel attendance before the issuing
court. Commonwealth v. Valotta, 73 Pitts. L.J. 1119 (Pa. 0. & T. 1925). They
are available in the criminal law for out-of-court contempt of a valid court order,
Commonwealth ex rel. DiGiacomo v. Heston, 292 Pa. 63, 140 Atl. 533 (1928),
or for "failure of a witness to attend in response to a subpoena . . . duly served,"
Silvagni v. Superior Court, 157 Cal. App. 2d 287, 290, 321 P.2d 15, 17 (Dist. Ct. App.
1958), or for securing the presence of a confined convict for purposes of another trial,
Ex parte Lowe, 94 Tex. Crim. 307, 251 S.W. 506 (1923). There is no apparent
foundation for the issuance of such a warrant in the present case since none of the
recognized grounds was present.
5
Mental Health Act § 604(a), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1304(a) (1954).
6 For a recent summary of the statutory commitment and release procedures
in American jurisdictions, see Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 293, 294-95, 306-07 (1958).
References therein to Pennsylvania law, however, do not include the Mental Health
Act of 1951.
7 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1221(b) (1954). A parallel grant of discretion is
found in the Pennsylvania statute dealing with criminal procedures, PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 1351 (1930).
8 PA. STAT. A1NW. tit. 19, §§ 1381, 1383 (1930). See Commonwealth v. Baginsky,
85 Pa. Super. 47 (1925); Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 77 Pa. Super. 136 (1921);
Commonwealth v. Ward, 15 Pa. D. & C. 213 (Quar. Sess. 1931) (parole refused
because petitioner was "potentially insane and will be rendered so upon imbibing
alcoholic liquors"). This provision was not given cognizance in the instant case, but
it is not clear whether this was due to inadvertence, its inapplicability, see note 25
infra, or its questionable relevance in the light of that provision of the Mental Health
Act of 1951 which provides for the repeal "of all other acts and parts of acts in
so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of . . . [it]." PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 50, § 1622 (1954).
9 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1354 (1930).
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Section 604(a) of the Mental Health Act provides for discharge from
custody "if, upon hearing, it appears that such discharge is for the best
interest of the patient and not incompatible with the public safety and
welfare." "o But section 801(6) of the same act provides for "release," as
of right, of every institutionalized patient "as soon as he is restored to
mental health and competent to manage his own affairs." 11 Prior Pennsylvania decisions have considered both restoration to mental health and
12
compatibility with the public welfare in passing upon discharge petitions.'
In the present case, which required for the first time a reconciliation of
these apparently conflicting provisions, the court determined that the
"right" to release under section 801(6) is not limited by the standard of
compatibility with the public welfare and safety provided by section
604(a).'3 The apparent inconsistency was avoided by construing the
latter section to mean that "the incompatibility with public welfare and
safety referred to in the act relates solely to the danger created by the mental
condition of the patient [and] where . . . the mental condition . . . no
longer causes peril, the possible danger from circumstances other than the
mental condition do [sic] not permit further confinement." 1
The court's reading of the statutes rejects the "plain meaning" of
section 604(a) that persons committed after acquittal should be subject to
discharge standards over and above restoration to mental health' 5
10 Mental Health Act § 604(a), PA. STAT. ANN. fit 50, § 1304(a) (1954).
"Mental Health Act § 801(6), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1481(6) (1954).
12 Commonwealth v. Cook, 390 Pa. 516, 135 A.2d 751 (1957); Fritz v. Farview
State Hosp. Superintendent, 174 Pa. Super. 609, 611, 101 A.2d 922 (1953) (dictum).
In both cases patients seeking discharge were found to be suffering from mental illness
at the time of their petitions, and the courts were obviously unable to apply, or even
consider, the mandate of § 801 (6).
13 One advantage of the court's interpretation is the avoidance of problems raised
by importing the § 604(a) incompatibility test into the situation of this case. A
mental patient whose commitment was a consequence of acquittal by reason of
insanity is not a wrongdoer in the eyes of the law, and unlike a patient under indictment or sentence for crime, he is no longer subject to the criminal jurisdiction of the
trial court. Such a mental patient's commitment "is not a sentence of the court. If
it was, the court would be sentencing the innocent .

.

.

."

Clearfield County v.

Cameron Township Poor Dist., 135 Pa. 86, 93, 19 Atl. 952, 954 (1890). He may be
detained by the statutorily granted discretion of the trial judge, but nothing in the
theory of his acquittal indicates that the committing judge can later apply special
release standards to such a person. His acquittal having been unqualified, 68 YALE
L.J. 293 n.2 (1958), he would appear to stand equally with all other mentally ill
persons over whom judges may have plenary jurisdiction. E.g., PA. STAT. ANN. fit.
50, §§ 1201 (a) (1) (ordinary mental illness), 1201(a) (3) (epileptics), 1201(a) (6)
(inebriates) (1954). See Weihofen, Institutional Treatment of Persons Acquitted
by Reason of Insanity, 38 TEXAS L. REV. 849, 855-57 (1960).
14 Instant case at 424.
15 The evident theory of the Mental Health Act is that any person confined in
a mental institution may be discharged by the institution if no harm will arise from
such discharge. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1301 (1954). An exception is made
for a person committed after being adjudged not guilty of crime by reason of
insanity, forbidding his release "without an order of the court in which he was . . .
acquitted." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1301(1) (1954). From this it would seem
to follow that some special discharge standard over and above the mere absence
of any apprehension of harm should be applied, rather than the broadly enunciated
"right" of release upon recovery from mental illness provided in § 801(6).
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perhaps, for example, the absence of criminal tendencies."6

Discharge is

made contingent only upon a determination that the patient has recovered
from his mental illness. This is a wholly acceptable standard where confinement for criminal defendants acquitted by reason of insanity is viewed
as a custodial opportunity for treatment 17 rather than as a requirement for
punishment.18 Neither the retributive theory of punishment nor the
deterrent theory of crime prevention logically justify the detention of
acquitted criminal defendants. There is no "guilt" to which the public
wrath can attach 19 and the very irrationality of mental illness precludes
deterrence of others who are mentally ill.20Moreover, once a person has
been restored to mental health, there is no foundation in our system of law
for continued custody based solely on the possibility of future criminal
2
activity. '

16This legislative term is defined in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1072(4) (1954).
But
See Commonwealth v. McAnany, 31 Pa. D. & C. 426 (Quar. Sess. 1938).
militating against the standard's use in proceedings like the present case is its omission
from the discharge section of the act and its application throughout the act only in
nonrelease contexts. See PA. STAT. ANor. tit. 50, §1225(d) (1954) (which hospitals may be designated for committed patients possessed of such tendencies); PA.
(under what circumstances transfers can be
STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1302 (1954)
effected for retarded persons); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50, § 1341 (1954) (when it is
acceptable to "board out!' patients).
37 "The primary purpose of the Mental Health Act . . . was to provide hospitalization, care and rehabilitation for mental defectives . . . . The reason for
such detention is not for punishment but rather for the benefit of the patient and
society." Commonwealth v. Linn, 3 Pa. D. & C.2d 417, 424 (0. & T. 1955). Accord,
Hough v. United States, 271 F.2d 458, 461 (D.C. Cir. 1959); WEIHOFEN, MENTAL
DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 483 (1954). The requirement of more than a
finding of restoration to mental health for release from detention-i.e., a requirement
of an additional finding of social adjustment sufficient to safeguard society against
future antisocial behavior--disadvantages those acquitted by reason of insanity for
crimes committed while insane vis-a-vis convicted criminals who complete their
sentences, or civilly committed mentally ill who regain their mental health. In both
the latter instances, the risk that the discharged person will repeat the behavior
that led to his original confinement is accepted as a workable compromise between
maximum security for society and maximum freedom for the individual. Commonwealth ex rel. Ross v. Dye, 102 Pitts. L.J. 485, 489 (Pa. C.P. 1954).
18 Such a motive engenders punitive-directed legislation such as prescriptions for
more stringent release standards for acquitted mental patients, WEIHOFEN, op. cit.
supra note 17, at 376; formulae for a minimum period of confinement before application for release may he made, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1705 (1956) and UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-24-16 (1953); vesting of release authority in the legislature or
governor, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122-86 (1958) and MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 123, § 101
(1957); or mandatory second jury trials on the issue of restoral of sanity, ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 592 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1960) and WASH. REv. CODE § 10.76.070
(1956). The same importing of punitive considerations into judicial determinations
is accomplished by conditioning release upon medical evidence of "complete recovery,"
In re Rosenfield, 157 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1957), remanded per curiam sub nora.
Rosenfield v. Overholser, 262 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ; or upon a stronger showing
of restoration to sanity than is required for patients civilly committed, e.g., In re
Dubina, 311 Mich. 482, 18 N.W.2d 902 (1945).
'9 See Weihofen, Crime, Law, and Psychiatry, 4 KAN. L. Rxv. 377, 385-88
(1956).
20 See WEmOFEN, op. cit. supra note 17, at 484-89.
21 The court specifically rejected any such form of "preventive criminal law
based on prediction." Instant case at 424. Cf. In the Matter of Williams, 157 F.
Supp. 871, 876 (D.D.C.), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Overholser v. Williams, 252
F.2d 629 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See also Weihofen, The Definition of Mental Illness,
21 OHio ST. L.J. 1, 11 (1960).
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The court's resolution of these conflicting statutory provisions necessitates a determination which is essentially medical rather than judicial or
social, and one which the detaining institutional authority seems best
equipped to make. 22 The court is thus relegated to a minor role, which
nonetheless need not be merely the stamping of judicial approval on the
institution's finding of recovery sufficient for release. 23 As the instant case
illustrates, the court may require an "observation" period 24 and appoint
whomsoever it regards as best qualified to act as its observer. At least
when the observer's findings parallel those of the institution where the
defendant had been detained, the court's decision to release will be grounded
in its satisfaction that the defendant is no longer mentally ill.
In ordering the disposition of the defendant's case, the court seemingly retreated from its conclusion that a mental patient committed after
acquittal is entitled to release under the standard of section 801 (6)-that
is, when "restored to mental health." 25 The defendant's release was conditioned for an indefinite term on "what might be described as 'psychiatric
out-patient probation.' "26 The court acknowledged that there is nothing
in the Mental Health Act which envisions such a disposition, but justified
its imposition of the condition by concluding that "the inconvenience of
weekly treatment and faithful cooperation with psychiatric service is not

an invasion of .

.

.

[defendant's] rights."

27

Exactly what these "rights"

might be was not considered, but presumably the court felt compelled, in
the absence of legislative authorization for such probation, to forestall
potential constitutional objections to the limited restraint on defendant's
22 Cf. WEIrOFEN, THE: URGE To PuNisH, 113, 119-20 (1956). But see Goldstein
& Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness, Some Observatiots on the Decision to
Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225, 227-32 (1960).
Concededly, supervisors of mental hospitals, like judges, are subject to strong social
pressures which inevitably influence their attitude toward releases for acquitted defendants. Concern about unfavorable public reaction to discharges which prove to
have been premature may well result in an institutional tendency to adopt overly
cautious standards of recovery in passing upon the release of this class of patients.
Weihofen, supra note 13, at 855, 864. At the same time, however, the administrative
desirability of alleviating chronic overcrowding of mental hospitals minimizes the
danger of an excessively conservative, public relations oriented discharge policy.
Commonwealth ex rel. Hartman v. Petry, 44 Dauph. Co. Rep. 289, 291 (Pa. C.P.
1937) ; Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 293, 303 (1958) ; cf. Crawfis, Civil Rights and Mental
Hospital Administration, 9 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 417, 418 (1960).
23A more direct approach, the elimination of an intermediary judiciary, has
recently been adopted by Arkansas and Texas, both of which have replaced their
statutory requirement of court approval with provisions allowing institutional release.
Compare ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-242 (Supp. 1959), and TEX. CODE CRIn. PROc. ANN.
art. 932b, § 2 (Supp. 1960), with Ark. Acts 1943, No. 241, § 16, and Tex. Laws 1937,
ch. 466, § 3. For a discussion of the extent to which automatic court approval results
in conferring legal "policy-making" functions on the medical profession, see Weihofen,
supra note 21, at 9-10.
24 Such an observance period is mandatory in some jurisdictions. E.g., CoLo.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-4(3) (Supp. 1957).
25The court's finding that defendant was restored to mental health precluded
the use of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1381, 1383 (1930), which are seemingly applicable to those not yet fully restored to mental health and which permit conditional
release. See note 8 infra.
26
1nstant case at 425.
27 Ibid.
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freedom. 28 Insofar as such an imposed treatment obligation-indefinitely
prescribed and with the forfeiture of all freedom as a sanction for noncompliance-differs only in degree from total confinement, apprehensions
concerning a deprivation of constitutional liberty seem warranted. To accord less than absolute ambulatory freedom to a person who has been
acquitted of crime and is mentally healthy is to fail to distinguish him
from a person who has been criminally convicted and from one who is
mentally ill. While both the latter may be subjected to conditions in lieu
of lawful total confinement, 29 those like defendant may not. The imposition
of seemingly innocuous conditions for treatment upon those not lawfully
confinable, in addition to lacking legal foundation, is aggravated by insulation from effective appellate challenge. One who has gained a substantial
degree of freedom will seldom be willing to risk it by an appeal which may
result in a new hearing "o-and possible recommitment to total custody.
Where this consideration combines with a lack of legislative authorization
for rehabilitory conditional probation,3 1 the judiciary should be extremely
hesitant in conditioning an individual's liberty, no matter how socially
33
desirable 32 such a disposition may appear in any given case.
28

Authors and judges have consistently, almost casually, stated that certain de-

tentions, when unguarded by procedural due process, amount to unconstitutional curtailments of the individual's "liberty." The beginnings appear to have been Underwood v. People, 32 Mich. 1 (1875); Petition of Doyle, 16 R.I, 537, 18 AtI. 159
(1889) ; In re Boyett, 136 N.C. 415, 48 S.E. 789 (1904). Since those cases, the cry
has been re-echoed without much elaboration. E.g., WEmHoF -T, INSANITY AS A DEFENSE IN CRMINAL LAW 276 (1933); Goldstein & Katz, supra note 22, at 237-38.
Scant regard has been accorded what "constitution" is involved, except for the suggestions in the Doyle case and by Weihofen that the federal constitution is infringed.
In the instant case, it is not alone the procedural safeguards which have been violated, but also the freedom of locomotion embodied in and guaranteed by PA. CoNsT.
art. 1, §§ 1, 9. Commonwealth v. Doe, 109 Pa. Super. 187, 190, 167 Atl. 241, 242
Whatever the scope of this right in an ordinary release situation, here
(1933).
there was a recapture of defendant from total liberty and a subsequent imposition
of conditioned liberty.
29 Cf. Commonwealth v. Schirmer, 32 Pa. D. & C. 36 (Quar. Sess. 1938) (commitment in lieu of sentence after guilty plea).
30 The finding of restoration to sanity has perfected the petitioner's right to
release, and review of a probationary disposition, if well pleaded, should result in the
removal of the limiting condition as being inapposite to the court's express finding
of regained mental health. Yet there is some risk that an appellate tribunal will
fasten on the inconsistency between the finding of petitioner's recovery and the order
withholding unconditional release, consider the finding itself tainted, and remand for a
rehearing on the issue of restoration to sanity. As but an application of a familiar
problem, this is a fitting of medical terminology into legal standards, WEIorHON,
THE URGE TO PuNIsH 44 (1956), but operates here so as to leave petitioner's mental
recovery open to judicial doubt. E.g., Overholser v. De Marcos, 149 F.2d 23 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
31 A few states have provided by statute for some form of conditional, supervised
release of acquitted, committed patients. Weihofen, supra note 13, at 867 & n.65.
This procedure is not always confined to merely those patients, but extends as well to
others mentally ill. E.g., CoLo. Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 71-1-28 (Supp. 1957).
32 One writer in this field has suggested that the supervised procedure adopted
in the instant case "should become the normal method of release . . . ." Weihofen,
supra note 13, at 867. See also WEIHOFEN, op. cit. 'sipranote 17, at 384.
83It is interesting to note that defendant in the instant case was rearrested
approximately two weeks after the court's outpatient-probation order, for an attempt
to commit much the same offenses he was accustomed to commit, see note 1 mspra.
Interview With Assistant Chief Probation Officer of the Quarter Sessions Court of
Philadelphia County, in Philadelphia, Pa., Jan. 30, 1961.
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LABOR LAW-DISTRICT COURT IMPOSES PUNITIVE DAMAGES nr
ACTION UNDER

LMRA

SECTION

301

FOR EMPLOYER'S BREACH OF

RUNAWAY SHOP CLAUSE

By a provision in its collective bargaining agreement with the plaintiff
union, defendant shoe manufacturer promised not to remove its shop from
Philadelphia during the life of the contract. Over a three-year period,
operations in the Philadelphia shop were retrenched while similar manufacturing at defendant's nonunionized plant in Hanover, Pennsylvania,
was expanded.' In 1957, the Philadelphia shop closed down completely.
Having held that this "removal of substantially the same shoemaking
operation from Philadelphia" to Hanover was a breach of the runaway
shop clause in the collective agreement,2 a federal district court, exercising
jursdiction under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of
1947,3 awarded the union $28,011 compensatory damages for loss of
member dues and went on to state that "the breach of contract here involved is more than a private dispute between an employer and a union;
rather, it is a violation of the national labor policy fashioned by Congress
and applied by the NLRB. The defendant-employer has knowingly and
wilfully violated that policy and deliberately run away from his responsibilities .

.

.

." 4

The court held the defendant liable for an additional

$50,000 in punitive damages. United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg.
Co., 187 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Pa. 1960), appeal docketed, No. 13421, 3d
Cir., Oct. 12, 1960.
Under the National Labor Relations Act, an employer who tries to
avoid continued dealings with a labor union 5 by moving his shop to a
locality where union power is less virile commits an unfair labor practice
and may be required by the NLRB to move his operation back to its
original location or to offer jobs to his old employees at the new plant site
and pay the cost of their relocation.6 These remedies obtain only if the
'In the spring of 1954, the defendant's partnership agreement had been secretly
re-executed for a three-year term by an instrument which provided that "as soon as
possible after May 1, 1954, . . . [the Philadelphia firm] shall restrict its manufacturing activities, but shall continue ownership of the capital stock of . . . [the
subsidiary
corporation running the Hanover shop]." Id. at 570.
2
United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 183 F. Supp. 568, 572, subsequent opinion, 187 F. Supp. 509 (E.D. Pa. 1960), appeal docketed, No. 13421, 3d
Cir., Oct. 12, 1960.
361 Stat. 156, 29 U.S.C. §§ 185(a)-(b) (1958).
4 United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 187 F. Supp. 509, 512 (E.D.
Pa. 1960), appeal docketed, No. 13421, 3d Cir., Oct. 12, 1960.
5 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, §8(a)(5), 49 Stat. 453, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (5) (1958) (refusal to bargain) ; cf. National Labor Relations Act of 1935,
§§7, 8(a)(1), 49 Stat 452, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1958) (interference with
employees' right of self-organization).
6 Diaper jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045 (1954) ; Tennessee-Carolina Tramp.,
Inc., 108 N.L.R.B. 1369 (1954); Rome Prod. Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217 (1948); Schieber
Millinery Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 937 (1940); Jacob H. Klotz, 13 N.L.R.B. 746 (1939).
See generally 50 COLUm. L. REv. 1123 (1950). In no case has the board ordered
return of the plant without permitting the employer to offer some alternative relief.
2 CCH LAB. L. REP. f3795.50 (1960). Remedies employed by the NLRB in runaway
shop cases are discussed in 53 MicH. L. REv. 627 (1955).
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employer's move was an unfair labor practice-a conclusion which depends
upon his motivation in making the move. It is permissible for an employer
to relocate his operation if the decision to do so is made in order to gain
a legitimate business advantage in the new location. 7 But in a highly
mobile industry like shoe manufacuring, s the union wants absolute protection from shops running away, regardless of employers' motivations.
By bargaining for an unconditional covenant that the shop will remain, a
union representing employees in such an industry attempts to acquire
legal rights which it does not have under statute but which it considers indispensable to the job security of its members.9
Labor agreements may be sued on in federal district courts under
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,10 but the
language of that section is silent as to the content of the substantive law
on which it feeds. In Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills," the Supreme
Court said that section 301 creates "federal law, which the courts must
fashion from the policy of our national labor laws . . . . The range of
judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem." 12
The present case is the first in which a federal court has been called
upon to fashion a remedy under section 301 for a runaway shop. 13 The
court tacitly assumed that its order would have to be designed to right the
7

Mount Hope Finishing Co. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 365 (4th Cir. 1954). Among
the privileged reasons for moving have been suggested cheaper materials, lower taxes,

more accessible markets, and lower rents. See WERNE, THE LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS 219 (1951). Even though an employer may have legitimate reasons for moving,
he still must be candid about his intentions to the union, so it can make intelligent
plans about representing employees in the new shop. Brown Truck & Trailer Mfg.
Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 999 (1953); cf. NLRB v. Lewis, 246 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1957)
(dictum), 11 VAND. L. REV. 635 (1958). But see Mount Hope Finishing Co. v.
NLRB, supra at 374. If one of the economic attractions of the new place is cheaper
labor (because nonunionized), then a nice question of bona fides is presented. At most
it can be said that a previous history of antiunion activities will weigh heavily against
an employer's assertion of pure motives. See Rome Prod. Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1217,
1233 (1948). Compare Diaper Jean Mfg. Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 1045, 1058-61 (1954),
with id. at 1061-63. See generally 11 VAND. L. REv. 635 (1958).
SThe reasons for plant mobility in the shoe industry are that the manufacturers'
investment in machinery is small because most of it is rented from one of two large
shoe machinery companies and that a large part (about one-third) of the total cost
of making shoes is labor cost, so a shoe manufacturer's margin of profit is especially
vulnerable to wage hikes. The natural reaction of a shoe manufacturer threatened
with demands for higher pay is to look for a new location where the wage scale is
lower. See Record, March 14, 1960, p. 114 (testimony of plaintiff's business agent) :
Record, Sept. 12, 1960, pp. 16-19 (testimony of a union organizer) ; Note, 34 TEMP.

L.Q. 136-38 (1961).

9 See testimony of union organizer that runawayism is "a major disease in the

shoe industry" in Record, Sept. 12, 1960, p. 15.

10 Note 3 supra; 1 WERNE, LAW AND PRAcTIcE OF THE LABOR CONTRACT § 10.01
(1957). Before the enactment of § 301, remedies for breach of collective bargaining
agreements were left to rather haphazard state law where parties had to contend with
the legal incapacity of unions as unincorporated associations and the common belief
that these agreements did not create enforceable rights. GREGORY, LABOR AND THE
LAW 444 (2d rev. ed. 1958) ; WERNE, op. cit. supra §§ 9.01, 10.21.
11353 U.S. 448 (1957).
2

Id. at 456-57.
was much judicial lawmaking about runaway shops before the NLRA
was passed. The remedies which the courts devised are discussed in Note, 36 CoLumx.
1

13 There

L. Rv. 776 (1936).
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legal wrong which was done to the union as an organization, not to compensate individual employees for wages lost when their shop moved away.14
But the court felt unable either to take the union to Hanover and install it
as bargaining representative there 15 or to bring the employer back to
Philadelphia and reestablish the union in its old position. 16 'Thus monetary
14Individual employees have no standing to sue under § 301. E.g., Disanti v.
Local 53, Fed'n of Glass Workers, 126 F. Supp. 747 (W.D. Pa. 1954); Silverton v.
Rich, 119 F. Supp. 434 (S.D. Cal. 1954)." And the Supreme Court has said that
unions may not bring actions under that section for breach of those terms of collective bargaining contracts which run solely to the benefit of employees. Association
of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437
(1955); cf. United Steelworkers v. Pullman-Standard Car Mfg. Co., 241 F.2d 547,
552 (3rd Cir. 1957). However, there is nothing in the Westinghouse case to suggest
that when a union has enough institutional interest in a breach of a collective bargaining agreement to invoke § 301 jurisdiction, the court hearing the action still cannot
give a remedy to compensate individual union members for damages suffered by
them as a result of the breach of contract sued upon. For example, it has been held
that a union has sufficient interest in the enforcement of the arbitration clause that
it may bring an action to enforce an arbitral award of back pay to individual employees. Textile Workers v. Cone Mills Corp., 268 F.2d 920 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
361 U.S. 886 (1959); A. L. Kornman Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 264
F.2d 733 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 819 (1959) ; United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) (by implication). Although the amount
of money the defendant will have to pay may be the same, the courts differ as to
whether the theory of such an enforcement is specific performance of the arbitration
award, see Textile Workers v. Cone Mills Corp., supra at 925, or damages caused by
the employer's breach of contract in refusing to obey the award, see A. L. Kornman
Co. v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers, supra at 737. If the latter-that is, if the
court can give the union a judgment against the employer measured by the injury
which the employees have suffered-then it is arguable that in the instant case, once
the court decided the union had enough organizational interest in the runaway shop
to satisfy the Westinghouse constriction of § 301, it could render a judgment taking into account the damages suffered by individual employees. True, the amount
of damages would have to be determined by the court, whereas in the arbitration
cases cited above the courts had the amount of damages already decided by the
arbitrators; but there is no reason in Westinghouse for this distinction to be significant. See generally Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. REV.
601, 638-45 (1956). An attempt had been made, under the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction articulated in Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933), to join individual
employees as plaintiffs in the instant action in order that they might recover for
lost wages due to defendant's removal to Hanover. The court recognized that Hur
speaks to joinder of nonfederal with federal grounds for relief in the same cause
of action, whereas the employees were attempting to join their nonfederal cause of
action with the union's federal cause of action. The individuals' complaint was
dismissed. United Shoe Workers v. Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co., 41 CCH Lab. Cas.
116553 (E.D. Pa. 1960). Subsequently defendant's former Philadelphia employees
have brought an action in a state court to recover lost wages. Sullivan v. Brooks
Shoe Mfg. Co., Phila. Common Pleas No. 7, Sept. Term 1960, No. 2833. After
dismissing the employees' action in the instant case, the court said nothing further
about relief for the union measured by the employees' damages, but only considered
remedies for the damage done to the union as an organization.
15 This would require the assent of a majority of defendant's Hanover employees
and would transgress the NLRB's domain. See National Labor Relations Act § 9,
49 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1958); NLRB v. Falk Corp.,
308 U.S. 453 (1940) ; United Elec. Workers v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
115 F.2d 488, 491 (2d Cir. 1940) ; cf. AFL v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401 (1940).
16 In its opinion the court mentions as its only reason for declining to fashion
such a remedy the "unwarranted economic hardship" which a move-back order would
impose upon the defendant. Instant case, 187 F. Supp. at 510. It probably had in
mind also the unfair effect which such an order would have had on the employees
of the Hanover shop. See Record, July 25, 1960, p. 6, where the court mentioned
that consideration in order to explain its unwillingness to enjoin the defendant from
continuing to operate the Hanover shop so long as the Philadelphia shop remained
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damages were the only way to redress the injury to the union organization
caused by defendant's breach of the agreement not to remove his shop from
Philadelphia. The instant case reasoned that, in light of the creative
authority bestowed by Lincoln Mills on federal courts hearing section 301
cases, the court is not limited by "common law doctrines of relief" 17 to
awarding compensatory damages alone: from the parties' agreement and
"federal labor policy" the court may draw power to punish the defendant
8
for breaking its contract.'
To justify its punitive order, the court looked to the fact that defendant's conduct, in addition to being a breach of contract, amounted to an
unfair labor practice. This "violation of the national labor policy," it concluded, permitted the court having jurisdiction of the contract action to
apply its usual sanction for controlling reprehensible violations of public
right-punitive damages. But such reasoning draws more from the label
"unfair labor practice" than that concept contains. The phrase, first used
with legal effect in the NLRA, is significant only in terms of the function
it performs within the statutory design-in terms of what the NLRB is able
to do to one who is charged with such behavior. And since it is well settled
that the NLRB cannot order punishment for one guilty of an unfair labor
practice,' 9 it goes beyond the policy of the national labor laws for a court
to sustain a punitive order on the grounds that defendant's conduct amounts
to an unfair labor practice.
A more fundamental objection to the court's articulated reason for
assessing punitive damages lies in the breadth of the purpose for which it
permits punishment to be used. The remedy employed, premised on measuring the defendant's conduct by a standard imposed by law rather than
one agreed to by the parties, clearly was intended to vindicate some kind
closed. Even if the court was unpersuaded by these elements, the facts of the instant
case that the Hanover shop existed long before the Philadelphia shop closed and
that the violation of the contract materialized over a long period of time might have
made the court unwilling to order an equitable remedy because of the supervision
which an appropriate one would entail. Compare Dubinsky v. Blue Dale Dress Co.,
162 Misc. 177, 292 N.Y. Supp. 898 (Sup. Ct 1936).
17 It is common dogma that "punitive damages are not recoverable for breach
of contract." RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 342 (1932); see 5 CoRBiN, C NRACTS

§ 1077, at 367 (1951) ; McCoPusicx, DAMAGES 291 (1935) ; 5 Wm.sox, CONTRACTS
§ 1338 (rev. ed. 1937). A few jurisdictions have tacked limited exceptions onto this
rule. E.g., Brown v. Coates, 253 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Welborn v. Dixon,
70 S.C. 108, 115, 49 S.E. 232, 234 (1904) (breach accompanied by fraudulent act) ;
Dallas Hotel Co. v. McCue, 25 S.W.2d 902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (wrongful conduct
must constitute an independent tort). See also Simpson, Punitive Damages for
Breach of Contract, 20 Oxzo ST. LJ. 284, 287 (1959) ; Note, Punitive Damages for

Breach of Contract in South Carolina, 10 S.C.L.Q. 444, 479-80 (1958).
18 Only one other case has been found in which a court has had to deal with

the question of punitive damages for breach of a collective bargaining contract.
Punitive damages contingent upon the union's persisting in its misconduct were

awarded under an arbitration clause and the lower court decreed enforcement of the

award, but this order was reversed on appeal on considerations of general contract
and arbitration law, the labor law problems not being specifically treated. Publishers'
Ass'n v. Newspapers & Mail Deliverers' Union, 111 N.Y.S.2d 725 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd,

280 App. Div. 500, 114 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1952).
'9

Republic Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10-13 (1940).
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of public right. This dialectic, that the unfair labor practice element in the
breach of a collective bargaining agreement is somehow like wantonness
accompanying a tort, suggests that whenever there is an unfair labor practice involved in a breach of contract the court does well to punish the defendant. There is a danger that the court's rationale for its decision may
be used to sustain promiscuous impositions of punitive damages: it does
not give proper credit to the fact that in the instant case the court was
likely driven to look for an extraordinary remedy because its equity arm
20
was tied by the unusual circumstances which constituted the breach.
In addition, by mulcting the defendant for an unfair labor practice, the
court undermines the basis on which it may assume jurisdiction in the case.
Ordinarily, jurisdiction over conduct which the NLRB could regulate is
left exclusively to that body. 2 1 But this rule does not preclude breach of
contract actions under section 301, even though the conduct alleged in
breach also constitutes an unfair labor practice. As one court verbalized its
conclusion, "the courts are concerned with the contract between the parties,
the Board is concerned with the effectuation of the declared policies of the
Act." 22 But as soon as the court does more than enforce the contract before it and begins to regulate labor-management relations by the very
norms employed by the NLRB, it collides with the power which Congress
23
has chosen to vest in that Board.
A monetary award exceeding compensation may be sustainable in the
present case on another basis, one turning on the difference in form and
function between collective bargaining agreements and ordinary commercial contracts.24 In most contract situations, although a party has a free
See note 16 supra.
21 San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)
20

(state court
preempted) ; Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957) (state labor
board preempted); Garner v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485 (1953) (state court
preempted) ; Aetna Freight Lines v. Clayton, 228 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 950 (1956) (federal court preempted) (alternative holding).
But see UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958) (common-law tort action may be
brought in state court although NLRB could give a remedy); Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, § 701, 73 Stat. 541, 29 U.S.C. § 164(c) (Supp.
1959) (states may assert jurisdiction over classes of cases which NLRB could but
declines to regulate).
22United Steelworkers v. New Park Mining Co., 273 F.2d 352, 358 (10th Cir.
1959) ; accord, Textile Workers v. Arista Mills Co., 193 F.2d 529 (4th Cir. 1951).
A more analytical discussion of a related problem, the arbitrability of grievances
involving unfair labor practices, may be found in Lodge 12, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists
v. Cameron Iron Vorks, 257 F.2d 467, 472-75 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880
(1958) ; cf. United Elec. Workers v. Worthington Corp., 236 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1956).
See generally Beatty, Arbitration of Unfair Labor Practice Disputes, 14 Aim. J.
(n.s.) 180 (1959); Dunau, Contractual Prohibition of Unfair Labor Practices:
JurisdictionalProblems, 57 CoLTJm. L. Rxv. 52 (1957).
23 Cf. Chief judge Parker's opinion that parties could not confer jurisdiction to
adjudicate unfair labor practices upon the courts by including a provision against such
practices in a collective bargaining agreement. Textile Workers v. Arista Mills Co.,
.vupra note 22, at 533 (dictum).
24 See Shulman, Reason, Contract,and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REv.
999, 1002-05 (1955). See generally Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1958). The precise holding of Textile Workers
v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)-that an agreement to arbitrate disputes is
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choice to perform his contract or to breach and pay compensatory damages,
the alternative to performance controls contractual irresponsibility enough
25
that the law has no need to apply additional penalties to contract breakers.
It is arguable, however, that a court operating under section 301 has more
to enforce than just the economic expectancy of the plaintiff-that section
301 manifests a congressional determination that collective bargaining
agreements should actually control the behavior of labor and management. 26
Consequently, some extraordinary remedy may be called for in circumstances in which the court cannot, by specific performance, mend a knows
ing breach.27 Damages which go beyond compensation serve this purpose.
A punitive award which has eaten into the defendant's profits from breakspecifically enforceable-indicates that in fashioning the law of labor contracts, the
Supreme Court does not propose to be bound by those accepted rules of contract
law, see 3 STORY, EQUITY JURIsPRUDENcE § 1900 (14th ed. 1918), which it deems
inappropriate to regulating labor relations. Cf. Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361
U.S. 459, 468-71 (1960). But cf. id. at 475-76 (dissenting opinion of Frankfurter, J.) :
"There is no reason for jettisoning principles of fairness and justice that are as
relevant to the law's attitude in the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements
as they are to contracts dealing with other affairs, even giving due regard to the
circumstances of industrial life and to the libretto that this furnishes in construing
collective bargaining agreements."
25 See 5 CoRiN, CONTRACTS § 1077, at 366 (1951).
26When the Taft-Hartley bill was being considered by Congress, one activity
which evoked strong concern was that of unions striking in the face of no-strike
clauses in their collective bargaining agreements. The feeling expressed by the
House and Senate reports was that making unions amenable to suit in federal courts
would not only enable employers to enjoin such strikes and collect damages for
losses caused -by them, but would also have a marked deterrent effect upon the
unions and their members. H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1947);
S. R P,. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 16-18 (1947). It is an interesting twist of
history that § 301 has been much more frequently invoked against, than by, employers.
Hoebreckx, Federal Courts Under Section 301, 43 MARQ. L. Rxv. 417, 419-20 (1960).
27 If the remedy of specific performance is not within the court's power because
of some statutory prohibition rather than just the practicalities of the factual situation, it is questionable whether the court would be permitted to do indirectly by
punitive damages what it could not do directly by an equitable decree. Such a situation might arise if § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.
§ 104 (1958), prohibits specific performance under § 301 of no-strike clauses in
See Hoebreckx, supra note 26, at 433-36. The second
collective agreements.
circuit says it does. A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 250 F.2d 326
Contra, Chauffeurs Union v.
(2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 282 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1960), cert. granted, 364
U.S. 931 (1961) (No. 527). See also Textile Workers-v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S.
448, 458 (1957).
28
Punitive damages should be limited to breaches where the defendant knew
his conduct transgressed the agreement. Collective agreements are frequently violated without bad faith merely because they do not spell out all the duties of each
side. See Shulman, supra note 24, at 1004-05. Admittedly, it introduces an element
unfamiliar in contract actions to draw a distinction between breaches made in bona
fide belief of right and those made knowing their illegality under the contract. But
the kind of conduct which § 301 was meant to eliminate was gross contractual irresponsibility. It would be unwise to punish those who act believing their conduct
permissible under the contract, for punishing them would tend to deter not breaches
of contract as such, but any conduct as to whose legality under the contract a party
has doubts. The upshot would be to force a party who wants to avoid punitive
liability to declaratory arbitration and litigation before doing any important act
which might be covered by the contract. In the instant case, one natural inference
to be drawn from the secrecy of the agreement, see note 1 supra, is that defendant
knew that carrying out its plan would violate its labor agreement.
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ing his contract may have a deterrent impact on future breaches of collective bargaining agreements where employers hope to "buy" their way
out of union contracts by paying over relatively insignificant compensatory
damages. This reasoning-that punitive damages may be used to deter
breaches of contract and used only as a last resort-focuses the attention
of courts operating under section 301 on what is properly their function:
if the courts do not try to control unfair labor practices but rather attempt
to promote contractual responsibility, they run no risk of applying NLRB
standards in a manner inconsistent with that Board's decisions.29 Furthermore, this reasoning withdraws the danger of punitive damages being used
indiscriminately as an ordinary remedy and reserves them for extraordinary situations-such as the one at hand, where the defendant's conduct effectively destroyed the parties' very bargaining relationship and
°
the court was helpless to reestablish it.3
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Plaintiff consulted defendant physicians, who were specialists in
neurology and psychiatry, for treatment of an emotional disorder. Combined electroshock and insulin subcoma therapy was prescribed; the plaintiff
consented to these treatments, but without, according to his own testimony,
having been forewarned of the possible risks involved. While undergoing
the treatment, plaintiff suffered a violent reaction which resulted in a
multiple fracture of the spine. From an unfavorable verdict in the resulting
action for malpractice, defendants appealed. Although reversing and
remanding on other grounds, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that
defendants were under a duty to inform the plaintiff of the possible serious
collateral hazards of the treatment. Whether there was a failure to inform
and whether such failure amounted to negligence were questions for the
jury to decide. Mitchell v. Robinson, 334 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1960).
In a similar case before the Supreme Court of Kansas, plaintiff had
undergone cobalt radiation treatment as a protective measure after the
29 Compare text accompanying notes 21-23 supra. Of course, if a complaint has
already been made to the NLRB about the same conduct alleged in the contract
action, the court should not hear the case. Cf. Elisco v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 387
Pa. 274, 128 A.2d 32 (1956).
But there is no reason for the court to stay its
remedial power in the contract action on the mere possibility that the NLRB's
jurisdiction as to the unfair labor practice might be invoked in the future. Note
also the NLRB's discretionary practice of acquiescing in arbitral awards not in conflict with the policies of the act. Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955).

80 Even if the court of appeals accepts the propriety of imposing punitive damages on the theory here developed, it might still remand the case for reassessment of
the award in the light of those factors which are now proper for the trial court,
in its discretion, to consider. If, as assumed, the purpose of the award is to deter
employers from running away, then the amount of the employer's increased profits
attributable to his change of location clearly becomes a relevant-and perhaps the
controlling-consideration.

1961]

RECENT CASES

removal of a breast cancer. Despite the fact that the defendant, a radiologist, took normal precautions, the applied radiation caused destruction of
much tissue in the area treated. From an adverse verdict in her action
against the physician based on his failure to disclose the risks involved in
the treatment,' plaintiff appealed to the state supreme court, which reversed
and granted a new trial. The court held that a physician violates his duty
to his patient and subjects himself to liability for negligence if he withholds any fact necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the
patient, and that under the circumstances of the case defendant's failure to
make any mention of possible hazards was, as a matter of law, a breach
of the duty to make a reasonable disclosure. Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan.
393, 350 P.2d 1093, opinion clarified, 187 Kan. 186, 354 P.2d 670 (1960).
A physician's legal duty, expressed in terms of the usual malpractice
standard, is to use such reasonable care and skill as is exercised by physicians of good standing in the community wherein he resides,2 who are of
the same school of practice,3 having due regard for the conditions of contemporary medical and surgical science. 4 In addition to the due care
standard, a patient's consent is a necessary prerequisite to any treatment
or operation, 5 and to proceed without consent may render the physician
liable for an assault and battery.6 Unauthorized treatment 7 includes not
only situations where the doctor proceeds in direct violation of an express
prohibition,8 but also those where there is no express prohibition and in
fact a benefit is probably conferred. 9 Consent induced by affirmative mis1 Here it was conceded that defendant had made no disclosure. However, there
was evidence that plaintiff had been informed of the dangers in the treatment by the
physician who performed the mastectomy and who suggested radiation therapy as a

further
safeguard. Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1099-1100 (Kan. 1960).
2
E.g., McHugh v. Audet, 72 F. Supp. 394, 399 (M.D. Pa. 1947); Adkins v.
Ropp, 105 Ind. App. 331, 334, 14 N.E.2d 727, 728 (1938); Viita v. Fleming, 132
Minn. 128, 136-37, 155 N.W. 1077, 1080-81 (1916).
3
E.g., Ayers v. Parry, 192 F.2d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S.
980 (1952) ; Force v. Gregory, 63 Conn. 167, 169, 27 Ati. 1116 (1893); Nelson v.
Nicollet
Clinic, 201 Minn. 505, 509, 276 N.W. 801, 803 (1937).
4
E.g., McHugh v. Audet, 72 F. Supp. 394, 399 (M.D. Pa. 1947); Adkins v.
Ropp, 105 Ind. App. 331, 334, 14 N.E.2d 727, 728 (1938); Loudon v. Scott, 58
Mont. 645, 654, 194 Pac. 488, 491 (1920).
5
Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905); Paulsen v. Gundersen,
218 Wis. 578, 260 N.W. 448 (1935) ; cf. Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 857 (1945). For a general discussion on the law of consent
in medical practice, see Wasmuth, Consent to Surgical Procedures, 6 CLE.-MAR. L.
REv. 235 (1957).
6See cases cited note 5 supra. These decisions differ from the typical assault
and battery cases in that the doctor is not usually acting maliciously but rather in
good faith for the patient's best interests. See McCoid, A Reappraisal of Liability
for Unauthorized Medical Treatment, 41 MINN. L. Rzv. 381, 424 (1957).
7 "Unauthorized" is used in the sense that either there was no consent, express
or implied, for the treatment given, or the consent given was invalid due to misrepresentations.
8 Rolater v. Strain, 39 Okla. 572, 137 Pac. 96 (1913) ; see Schloendorff v. Society
of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (dictum).
9 Pratt v. Davis, 224 Ill. 300, 79 N.E. 562 (1906) ; Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn.
261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905). Both cases emphasized the right of the patient not to be
touched except with consent. However, both courts recognized that there might be
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representation, ° or even by failure to make known the inevitable consequences of a proposed operation, may render a physician liable for an
intentional tort."' Although malpractice and unauthorized treatment are
generally handled as discrete issues, there has been at least one instance
of an inclination to apply negligence principles in an unauthorized treatment setting. 1 2 And there has been dictum that a physician subjects himself to malpractice liability if he withholds from the patient any fact necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent. 13 The instant cases, however, are the first to impose a concrete and specific duty upon a physician
to disclose a proposed treatment's inherent risks. 14
The present decisions alter the standard of care in at least one group
of malpractice cases. Mitchell places a general duty upon physicians to
inform patients of possible serious collateral hazards; 15 whether this duty
has been fulfilled is a question of fact for decision by the jury, unaided by
expert testimony. Natanson limits the duty to a disclosure of those facts
necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent. The sufficiency of
the information disclosed is a factual question for the jury, again unaided,
to decide; but unlike Mitchell, whether a particular disclosure comports
with reasonable professional practice necessitates expert medical testimony. To some extent the standard of Natanson is internally inconexceptional circumstances in which consent would be impractical. See note 24 infra
and accompanying text; McCoid, supra note 6, at 387-89. Of course the same
liability has been found in cases where the treatment resulted in serious physical
injury. See Wall v. Brim, 138 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 857
(1945).
10Birnbaum v. Siegler, 273 App. Div. 817, 76 N.Y.S.2d 173 (1948) (memorandun decision) (misrepresentation) ; cf. Wall v. Brim, supra note 9 (failure to
inform). See also Bartell v. State, 106 Wis. 342, 82 N.W. 142 (1900) (fraud).

11 Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 251 Minn. 427, 88 N.W.2d 186 (1958)
(assault and battery; physician has duty to disclose that proposed operation would
result in sterilization).
12 Hunt v. Bradshaw, 242 N.C. 517, 88 S.E.2d 762 (1955), 40 MINN. L. REv.
876 (1956). Plaintiff underwent an operation for the removal of a small piece of
metal from his neck. The object was causing no adverse effect but could possibly
have penetrated vital organs. As a result of the operation, plaintiff's hand was
paralyzed. Plaintiff alleged that the doctor was negligent in stating that the operation was simple when in fact it was dangerous, and that he would not have undergone
surgery except for that assurance. The court stated that "under the facts of the
case" the failure to disclose risks was not negligence. Since the Hunt case involved
actual representation, the plaintiff's claim would seem to be stronger than in either
of the present cases.
13 Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560,
578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
14 It is likely that the high degree of risk present in each of the treatments
motivated the courts in their present holdings; the Mitchell rule is in fact limited to
high risk situations. But aside from being a factor militating towards a disclosure
of the risk, the high incidence of injury is also significant in that it obtains even
though the physician takes all reasonable precautions. Since there will be no liability for negligence, the area is ripe for "humanitarian" attempts at new theories
of recovery. Address by William J. McAuliffe, Jr., Joint Medical-Legal Conference
of the State Bar of South Dakota and the South Dakota State Medical Association,
in Sioux Falls, S.D., Sept. 24, 1960, reproduced and on file in Biddle Law Library,
University of Pennsylvania. The instant cases illustrate the success of such attempts.
15 Compare Bolam v. Friern Hosp. Management Comm., [1957] 2 All E.R. 118.
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sistent: 16 the court's rule attempts to safeguard the physician who complies with usual medical standards; but the case goes on to hold that, even
though the defendant may have acted in accord with reasonable medical
practice,1 7 his complete nondisclosure established a prima facie breach of
duty. Thus Mitchell and, to a lesser extent, Natanson reject the criterion
long applied in malpractice cases-that the physician's conduct must not be
lower than the standard of reasonable medical practice in the community.
This course necessarily entails the similar rejection of another element of
malpractice law: that a plaintiff's case will fail in the absence of expert
The shifted burden of introducing expert testimony will
testimony.'
enable plaintiff's case to get to a jury without the aid of such evidence.' 9
In the present cases, a rule applicable to traditional assault and battery
has been blended with standard malpractice law.20 The logical basis for
considering the unauthorized treatment cases as a form of assault and
battery is that liability turns on a single issue of fact: did the patient con16 The Natanson court does imply that in "some cases" the duty to disclose would
not be applied; the question then resolves into whether the judiciary is competent to
decide which cases these are. At another point the opinion seems to limit the
qualification to risks likely to be fatal. This idea is traceable to Lund, The Doctor,
the Patient, and the Truth, 19 TENN. L. REv. 344 (1946), and Smith, Therapeutic
Privilege to Withhold Specific Diagnosis from Patient Sick with Serious or Fatal
Illness, 19 TEN. L. REv. 349 (1946), neither of which speaks to situations like the
instant cases. These articles point out that application of such a limitation does not
relieve the physician from the duty of making a disclosure of the relevant facts to the
patient's next of kin. But the reasons for informing relatives do not apply in the
instant cases; it is the patient who must be told for consent purposes; the risk involved is not of a fatal nature which otherwise might argue for disclosure so that
the patient may "put his house in order"; and disclosure may have adverse ramifications. See note 28 infra and accompanying text.
17 In the instant cases, however, there seems to be no valid reason why medical
practice would not require a full disclosure.
18 See, e.g., Boyce v. Brown, 51 Ariz. 416, 77 P.2d 455 (1938); Hodgson v.
Bigelow, 335 Pa. 497, 7 A.2d 338 (1939). See generally REGAN, DOCTOR AND PATIENT
AND THE LAW 206-09 (3d ed. 1956); McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. Rxv. 549, 614-21 (1959). The only basic exception to this
rule is res ipsa loquitur. Id. at 621-31. However, dictum in Natanson indicates
that if in fact there had been some disclosure, it would have been plaintiff's burden
to introduce expert testimony to prove the insufficiency of such disclosures. 354
P.2d at 673.
19It has been stated that the majority of malpractice claims are unjustified.
Regan, Malpractice and the Physician, 147 A.M.A.J. 54 (1951). One obstacle that
tends to limit the number of actions brought is the requirement of expert testimony
to substantiate a claim. The mere bringing of a malpractice action can be damaging
to a physician regardless of the outcome. Moreover, as the number of malpractice
cases rises, the public confidence in the medical profession tends to fall. Ibid. If
the lowering of the expert testimony barrier would result in the bringing of a larger
number of justifiable complaints, such an adjustment might be in order. More likely,
however, it would only result in a larger number of sham claims, particularly those
of people dissatisfied with treatment to which they originally consented. See
McCoid, supra note 6, at 426. Both the instant cases would allow the jury to decide
the issue of informed consent. For the dangers of this procedure, see Hendrix,
"Informed Consent"--New Area of Malpractice Liability?, Medicolegal Digest,
June 1960, p. 11.
20For a discussion of the practical differences between the two types of actions,
see McCoid, supra note 6, at 383-84. In Natanson, a negligence standard based
partly on consent is applied; in Mitchell a consent standard is not specifically adopted,
but the practical effect of the court's rule is the same as if such were adopted.
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sent to the treatment given? 2' But in the instant cases it is undisputed
that consent had initially been given; 22 the question is not whether the
doctor has proceeded without authorization,23 but whether he has fulfilled
his duty to inform the patient-a question of medical practice. 24 In the
past, the courts, in framing malpractice law, have seen fit to allow the
medical profession to set its own standards and, from a practical point of
view, to judge its own members. 25 The predominant role which the medical
profession plays in framing its own legal standard can be rationalized only
by concluding that the courts recognize that they are less qualified than
the medical profession to frame the malpractice standard; that each medical
case involves an inscrutable ad hoc balancing of multiple factors, some
human and incalculable, and some scientific and calculable; and that a better
overall result will be achieved by leaving the medical profession unencumbered by strict legal rules. 26 There are no compelling reasons not to
apply this policy in the present cases. The argument put forth by those
who advocate the application of the "consent" doctrine's tort standard seems
to be that the peculiar fiduciary relationship of doctor to patient imports
2
an obligation on the former to inform the latter of all relevant facts. '
See notes 5-9 supra and accompanying text.
22 It is questionable whether a legal standard should be framed around a question
which is in point of fact not in issue and clearly not the crucial consideration of the
case. There might be some merit in such a standard if the Natanson court had been
consistent in its reasoning. To this end, in emphasizing the consent element, it would
have been necessary to set forth a rule under which consent would be ineffective.
Such a rule inevitably would be similar to the one applied in cases where consent is
induced by affirmative misrepresentation or actual fraud. See note 10 supra and
accompanying text. It is clear, however, that no such reasoning was adopted in
Natanson and that the standard enunciated was based essentially on negligence-a
physician is negligent if he fails to disclose, sufficiently to form the basis of an informed
consent, a substantial risk of injury inherent in proposed medical treatment.
See
23 The same reasoning applies to the "affirmative misrepresentation" cases.
note 10 supra and accompanying text. There, however, additional problems are
involved. It is questionable whether a physician should be allowed to misrepresent
proposed treatment at least in the situation where the patient specifically asks for a
factual disclosure. It seems therefore more reasonable to treat such cases as intentional torts, putting the burden on the physician to justify his actions.
24 Even in the unauthorized treatment cases, see notes 5-10 supra and accompanying text, the law recognizes that in certain situations it is necessary for the
physician to proceed without consent. Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d
754 (1956) ; Bennan v. Parsonnet, 83 N.J.L. 20, 83 AtI. 948 (Sup. Ct. 1912) ; Luka
v. Lowrie, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912). See Wasmuth, spra note 5, at 238.
25 See notes 2-4 supra and accompanying text.
See generally
26 Cf. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
Zilboorg, A Step Toward Enlightened Justice, 22 U. Cmi. L. Rxv. 331 (1955).
27 See Wohlgemuth v. Meyer, 139 Cal. App. 2d 326, 293 P.2d 816 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1956); Adams v. Ison, 249 S.W.2d 791, 793-94 (Ky. 1952). See also Swan,
The California Law of Malpractice of Physicians, Surgeons, and Dentists, 33 CALIF.
L. REv. 248, 251 (1945) ; Smith, Antecedent Grounds of Liability in the Practice
of Surgery, 14 RocKy MT. L. RFv. 233, 249 (1943). Note the conclusion in Kenny v.
Lockwood, [1932] 1 D.L.R. 507, 528 (1931) (Ontario Ct. App.) (concurring opinion),
that the fiduciary relationship does not warrant imposing a duty on the physician to
disclose all the facts. Another argument is that a person should be protected
against undesired touch. See Wasmuth, supra note 5, at 236. This is in fact the
rationale of the traditional assault and battery rule. While justifiable in an assault
and battery context it seems to be inapplicable to the present situation; the patient
has in fact consented to the touching.
21
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But disclosure is not the sole nor even the predominate obligation of the
medical practitioner; his most fundamental duty is to do what is best for
the patient's welfare. Any conflict between this duty and that of disclosure
should be resolved in favor of the primary duty. Disclosure sufficient to
form the basis of an intelligent consent could conceivably alarm an already
unduly apprehensive patient to the point that he might refuse necessary
treatment even if the risk is in fact minimal. Such disclosure could actually
increase the risks through adverse psychological effects. 28 Both of these
possibilities were recognized by the courts in the instant decisions. But
to handle these situations properly, the courts should not as a general rule
insist on an informed consent; 29 the physician, in his best judgment, might
well conclude that full disclosure is unwise.30 Even recognizing that the
problem is easily overstated-in that reasonable medical practice will likely
dictate a full disclosure in most cases,31 the best interests of doctor and
patient militate toward giving the physician discretion not unduly en32
cumbered by the contingency of future liability.
-28 These reasons were set forth in Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of
Trustees, 154 Cal. App. 2d 560, 578, 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
They lessen the force of the overly broad argument that in all cases the patient
should be the one to decide what is to be done with his body. See Mohr v. Williams,
95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905); LONG, THE PHYSICIAN AND THE LAW 28 (2d
ed. 1959).
29 In order for the physician to satisfy the rule of the present decisions it will be
necessary for him to disclose all that reasonably could be insisted upon. It can be
foreseen, therefore, that the present decisions may have a tendency to cause the
physician to disclose matters not so much out of consideration for his patient's
best interests but for his own protection, and in doing so some of these dangers may
be realized. See Hendrix, mupra note 19.
30This conclusion is not applied to the cases involving unauthorized treatment,
see notes 5-10 .spra and accompanying text, but is limited to the fact situation of the
present cases. The former cases are firmly established in the law, and there is no
compelling reason to overrule them. A patient can still sue his physician for unauthorized treatment if the misconduct fits into this category.
33 Cf. Shehee v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 122 F. Supp. 1, 6 (W.D. La. 1954)

(dictum).

See also

FLETCHER, MORALS AND

MEDICINE

60-64 (1954); Sympostum:

Morals and Medicine and the Law, 31 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1157 (1956).
32The contingency will be magnified as the nature of proposed treatment becomes more generalized. Assuming the relative ease of counseling a patient as to
the risks of a specific treatment such as electroshock or cobalt irradiation, consider
the plight of a practitioner faced with the prospect of relating the multitude of hazards
involved in surgical operations running the gamut from dental extraction and simple
tonsillectomy to delicate and complex repair of vital members. Fault-free mishaps
can occur at any point along the continuum of therapy; reaction to anesthesia or
antibiotics, toxic effects of transfusion, and so on, are possibilities in many cases.
An undertaking to warn of all risks would not only amount to extensive pedagogics
beyond the comprehension of most patients, but would also cause a sizable distraction
from the time a physician can spend in the practice of his science. Public policy
should find such demands unwarranted when 'offset only by the reasons for the legal
requirement of consent.

